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STUDENT COMMENTS
The following comments were written by students at Northwestern University School of Law.
Contributors to the present issue are Alan D. Nesburg, William S. McKay, Jr., Donald l. Flayton,
William H. Luking, John L. Roplequet and George L Gellman.
JUVENILE DUE PROCESS IN THE LOWER COURTS
The 1967 decision of the Supreme Court in In
re Gault' marked the beginning of a new phase in
the American experiment with juvenile courts.2
The Court attempted to remedy the unfairness it
perceived by applying fourteenth amendment due
process standards to juvenile hearings. As a result,
some of the unique procedural flexibility enjoyed
by juvenile courts was circumscribed by the intro-
duction of due process safeguards. While the Gault
holding was carefully limited by the Court's opin-
ion, subsequent decisions have gone beyond Gault
and further limited the juvenile court's procedural
freedom. This comment will examine some of those
decisions and their implications for future exten-
sions of procedural due process standards to
juvenile proceedings.
TRADITIONAL PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY
IN THE JUVENILE COURT
A fundamentally humanitarian impulse pro-
duced the juvenile court movement in the United
States. At the turn of the twentieth century, civic-
minded groups and individuals3 sought to reform
the usual practice whereby youthful offenders were
tried and punished as adults. 4 Such treatment of
juveniles often resulted in unnecessarily harsh
punishment, undesirable, confinement of children
with adult criminals, and the lifelong stigma of a
criminal conviction. 5 Reformers argued persua-
1387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 It is generally recognized that the experiment began
with the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, passed in 1899.
See, e.g., Abbott, The History of The Juvenile Court
Movement Throughout the World, in THE CIILD, Tmx
CLINIC AND Tim COURT 267, 270 (1925).
3 For a brief background of the reform movement, see
Platt, The Rise of the Child-Saving Movement, in DE-
LINQUENCY AND SOCLn PoucY 15 (P. Lerman ed.
1970).
4 The common law exception to adult treatment for
juveniles was that children under seven years of age
were regarded as incapable of forming criminal intent.
See, e.g., Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom?, 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 401, 405 (1967).5 For example, one writer, a Los Angeles juvenile
court referee, thought the juvenile court should func-
tion to save children from an ordeal with a penitentiary
sively that children who had experienced a term in
prison or jail were often lost to a life of crime. The
fruition of the reform movement was the juvenile
court, which was to function as a children's clinic
rather than a criminal court.6 In lieu of punish-
ment, the juvenile court's proponents looked to
or prison, as well as shield them from criminal court-
room procedure. Van Waters, The Juvenile Court From
the Child's Viewpoint, in Tix CHILD, THE CINIC AND
TEE COURT 217-25 (1925). Another writer, a police
court judge, noted that courts in the 1800's did not
hesitate to imprison ill-behaved children. His writing
traced the early English efforts to remove children
from prison influences. H. WADDY, T=E PoI cE COURT
AND ITS Wo ic 107-16 (1925).
6 See, e.g., Hoffman, Organization of Family Courts,
With Special Reference to the Juvenile Court, in TE
CHI), TE CLINIC AN D x COURT 255 (1925), where
it is submitted that delinquency is a disease and that
"the delinquent child is entitled to treatment analogous
to that given a child afflicted with any organic or func-
tional disease." Consider also Van Waters, supra note
5, at 218, quoting from Judge Julian Mack on the
nature of the court's inquiry into the child's back-
ground: "What is he, how has he become what he is,
and what would best be done in his interest to save him
from a downward career." Little attention was given
to whether a child had committed a specific offense.
Rather, the inquiry was whether he was wayward and
missing his fundamental childhood rights to shelter and
guidance. Referee Van Waters also saw in the juvenile
court a reflection of reformers' beliefs that human con-
duct is caused and if the causes are understood, chil-
drens' behavior could be modified. Id. at 223-25. judge
Mack also articulated the need for the juvenile court to
recognize the causes leading to wrongdoing. Mack,
Chancery Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE CmIn,
TE CLINIC AND THE COURT 310-15 (1925). Likewise,
two other influential writers in the juvenile court field
stated that the juvenile court's emphasis was not on
the act done by the child, but on the social facts and
circumstances that are the inducing causes of the child's
appearance in court. B. FxNER & R. BAInwlN,
JUVENILE CouRTS AND PROBATION 6 (1914). Cf. Witter
v. Cook County Commissioners, 256 Ill. 616, 623, 100
N.E. 148, 150 (1912):
The infant is not brought before the court as a
defendant charged with an infraction of the laws,
but is brought within the jurisdiction of the court
to receive its care and protection.
As an indication of the reformers' effort to completely
separate the juvenile court from the criminal court,
there was even opposition to the use of ordinary court-
room furniture in the juvenile court. See WADDY, supra
note 5, at 143-45.
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rehabilitation as their goal As agent of the state,
the juvenile court would exercise the state's power
as parens patriae, which is the right to step in and
replace the natural parents if they default.8 The
task of the fatherly judge and his aides was to as-
sess the child's entire background before deciding
what was best for the youngster's future.9 During
the hearing itself, the judge was to evaluate the
clinical reports of experts and hear testimony per-
taining to the child's problems.i Following the
hearing, the judge would select an appropriate
remedy from a wide variety of alternative disposi-
tions. Most juvenile court reformers believed that
the routine disposition for juvenile offenders would
be probation, with commitment only the last re-
sort."
Just as the clinical function differentiated it from
the criminal court, the juvenile court was also es-
tranged from its criminal counterpart in terms of
procedure. In the framing of the pioneer Illinois
juvenile court lawngreat care was taken to elimi-
nate in every way the idea of a criminal pro-
cedure." 12 Specifically, juvenile procedure was to
7 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 262-63.
8 For a discussion of the background of the concept
of parens patriae, see Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARv. L. Rxv. 104 (1909), and Mack, supra note 6,
at 310-15. The concept is also discussed by FEX=NER &
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 6-8. The Supreme Court in
Gault questioned the applicability of the parens patriae
doctrine in the juvenile court context. 387 U.S. at 16-17.
Similar doubts are expressed in Note, A Due Process
Dileinvia-Juries For Juveniles, 45 N.D.L. REv. 251,
264-66 (1969), and the author suggests that the juvenile
court should be recognized as a separated entity.
9 The probation officer was to be the investigatory
arm of the court, assisted by voluntary community
agencies. Mack, supra note 6, at 315.
10 See Platt, supra note 3, at 18: "Judges were ex-
pected to show the same professional competence as
doctors and therapists."
1 It has been said that the parent has the primary
right to custody of his child, and this right is ordinarily
not to be interfered with. FsmtXNR & BArwvvN, supra
note 6, at 9. Judge Mack adopted the same view,
emphasizing the importance of probation and the need
to avoid separating child from parent. Mack, supra
note 8, at 116. A third writer stated:
My own view ... is that no child should be sent
to an industrial or reformatory school if there is
any reasonable hope of improving him by other
means.
W. HAL, CHIrDREN'S CounRTs 142 (1926).
"2 See generally Hurley, Origin of the Illinois Juvenile
Court Law, in THE Cmw, = CLiNic AND THE COURT
320, 327 (1925), where the author states:
The law was expressly framed to avoid treating a
child as a criminal. To this end the proceedings
were divested of all features which attach to a
criminal proceeding. Instead of a complaint or an
indictment, a petition was suggested; instead of a
warrant, a summons. The child was not to be ar-
rested, but brought in by the parent or guardian,
be distinguished from criminal procedure in that
there would be no right to a jury, no swearing-in of
young witnesses, no appearance of counsel for the
juvenile, no right to bail, and no rules of evidence.?
Further, there was no right to notice of the charges,
no right to confrontation and cross-examination,
and no privilege against self-incrimination. 4 The
entire proceeding was to be characterized by flexi-
bility and simplicity.
The arguments presented on behalf of this flexi-
ble procedure revolved around the central notion
of benefit to the child. It was argued that simplified
procedure enabled the child to understand the pro-
ceedings 5 and spared him the trauma of a public
trial. 6 The juvenile court judge was said to be most
effective, and the child received the most benefit,
in an informal atmosphere conducive to developing
rapport. 7 It was also argued that informal pro-
cedure encouraged the child to discuss his problems
freely, thus giving the judge a fuller picture of the
youth's needs. When juvenile procedure was first
attacked in the courts as amounting to a denial of
due process, the challenge was successfully met by
the assertion that the proceedings were "civil," not
or by a probation officer. The bill expressly forbade
keeping a child in jail or enclosure where adults
were confined.
13 Id. at 328; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
See also Fortas, supra note 4, at 406; Gardner, Gault
and California, 19 HAST. L.J. 527, 528 (1969); Annot.,
43 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1955).
Regarding the rules of evidence, Hurley, supra note
12, at 328, stated that strict application of the rules
did not comport with informal procedure. In contrast,
another writer believed that the rules of evidence should
be adhered to:
It is of course necessary that so long as criminal
responsibility attaches to a developed child, the
trial of a juvenile offender... must take place with
due regard to formality in a court of justice, and
be conducted according to the rules of evidence.
WADDY, supra note 5, at 145. Contrast also the comment
made in Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The .Polie, State
Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HAlv. L. REv.
775, 795 (1966):
But to the extent that the rules of evidence are not
merely technical or historical, but like the hearsay
rule have a sound basis in human experience, they
should not be rejected in any judicial inquiry.
'4 See generally note 13 supra; 387 U.S. at 14, 29; the
cases cited in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 563
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
'
5 WADDY, supra note 5, at 146. See also HALL, supra
note il, at 59, where he states that it is essential in
children's courts to secure the utmost simplicity in the
proceedings.
'6 See, e.g., In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529-30, 169
S.E.2d 879, 887 (1969), holding there is no constitu-
tional right to a public hearing in a juvenile proceeding.
The Supreme Court in Gault mentioned that juveniles
are often denied a public trial. 387 U.S. at 14.
7 See Note, supra note 13, at 802.
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"criminal," and the child was not entitled to safe-
guards enjoyed by a criminal defendant 2 But for
a state to maintain that its juvenile proceedings
were "civil" in nature, it had to appear that the
child was being rehabilitated and not punished as
an adult1 9 Thus, arguments supporting a flexible
juvenile procedure depended both on the absence
of punishment and the success of rehabilitation.
Should the juvenile court undertake to punish
youths, or fail to rehabilitate them, much of the
justification for simplified procedure would be lost,
leaving only the argument that the child benefits
from the informal courtroom situation.
Unfortunately, rehabilitation efforts have been
conspicuously unsuccessful.20 The failure of the
IsMack cited some of the cases which accepted this
justification. Mack, supra note 8, at 109-14 (1909).
The justification was emphatically rejected by the
Supreme Court. 387 U.S. at 49-50. The Court empha-
sized that at least for the purpose of the privilege against
self-discrimination, proceedings which may lead to
commitment must be regarded as "criminal." The
Court's reasons were that commitment, realistically
viewed, is always a deprivation of liberty, and that
some juveniles may even be placed in the same institu-
tions as adults. Also, the juvenile court may bind a
juvenile over for a criminal trial.
19 See, e.g., HAL., supra note 11, at 244, stating that
the juvenile court "exists solely for the purpose of
helping the child." The important point is that the
claim of "rehabilitation, not punishment" shielded
the juvenile court from constitutional attack. As one
writer perceptively observed, the juvenile court could
no longer exist once it began to mete out punishment:
It has been held that the juvenile court acts framed
on this theory [parens patriae] must not provide
for that which is dearly punishment, e.g., a fine or
penalty, either of which would make them uncon-
stitutional.
FLxzR & BA.DWiN, supra note 6, at 9.20 See S. WmEzrrR & L. Cornxr, Juvimm Dx-
LINQUNCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CoNno. 32 (1966):
Juvenile court operations and procedures have
been subject to many criticisms in recent years.
Any close look at the facilities and alternative
dispositions actually available to the juvenile
court makes it clear that the promise of the court
has gone largely unfulfilled. In theory, the court
could embody its spirit of individualized justice
by providing a detailed diagnosis of the problems
of the juvenile in question, followed by the de-
velopment of a treatment plan that would help
solve those problems....
But the reality in most jurisdictions is that
these facilities are so underdeveloped and under-
staffed that one cannot speak of them as in any
sense the equivalent of parental care and protec-
tion.
The Supreme Court uecision in Gault relied heavily on
the Wheeler and Cottrell study.
A Pennsylvania court made this succinct remark on
the failure of rehabilitation:
With the passage of years, however, the grand
hopes for the juvenile court system were never
realized. Juvenile Court judges were not well
juvenile courts was aptly summarized in Kent v.
United States:
[t]here may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children.21
Not only were understaffed juvenile courts unable
to investigate thoroughly the background of each
child appearing before them, but also children were
sometimes sent to institutions when probation ap-
peared to be a more desirable alternative.2 2 Once
rehabilitative treatment failed, the distinction be-
tween adult imprisonment and juvenile commit-
ment was no longer compelling. It was therefore
forseeable that the courts would act to equalize
adult and juvenile due process rights by eliminating
procedural distinctions between adult and juvenile
"trials."
In Kent v. United States,5 the Supreme Court's
first decision involving juvenile courts, the Court
refused to countenance a procedural shortcut taken
at heavy cost to a youthful defendant. The District
of Columbia Juvenile Court had waived jurisdic-
tion of a sixteen-year old and directed that he be
held for a regular criminal trial on charges of rape,
housebreaking and robbery.24 Kent moved to dis-
miss the criminal indictment on the grounds that
the juvenile court's waiver was procedurally invalid
because the court had failed to give any reasons.
That motion was denied and Kent was found guilty
at his criminal trial. Although the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
judge,25 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the juvenile court's waiver was procedurally in-
valid. 26 The Kent decision was not of constitutional
trained. Institutions were woefully inadequate.
Psychiatric, psychological, probationary and
sociological services were meager.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 70,
234 A.2d 9, 13 (1967). See also Boches, Juvenile Justice
in California: A Re-Evaluation, 19 HAsT. L.J. 47, 103
(1967).
21 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 1966).22See, e.g., WnEELR & CoT u., supra note 20,
at 32; 387 U.S. at 19-20.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
24 Id. at 546.
343 F.2d 247 (1965).
20383 U.S. at 557. The Court noted that the conse-
quence of a waiver was to subject the juvenile to the
possibility of a criminal punishment which was more
severe than juvenile treatment. The Court also pointed
out that the Juvenile Court Act provided for a waiver
only after a "full investigation" and here there was no
record of such an investigation. Id. at 546-47.
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dimension,n since it was based on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act,
sitting as the highest court of the District of Colum-
bia. The Court interpreted the juvenile Court Act
as entitling a juvenile to both a hearing with effec-
tive assistance of counsel and a statement of the
juvenile court's reasons for its waiver.28 Despite the
fact that the Court was not erecting a constitu-
tionally required rule, the Court did express its
overall concern with juvenile procedure, fore-
shadowing its landmark decision in Gault.
219
In In re Gault the Court attempted to seek out
the "reality" of the juvenile court's operation."
The Court said that application of the "civil" label
to juvenile proceedings was mere rhetoric, and ob-
served that juvenile commitment amounted to a
loss of liberty for a term of years, the same as
criminal imprisonment. 31 The holding of Gault was
narrow in two important respects. First, the Court
held only four specific elements of due process con-
27The Court declined the invitation to "rule that
constitutional guarantees which would be applicable to
adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent
was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceed-
ings." 383 U.S. at 556.
29Id. at 557. The Court stated:
we conclude that, as a condition to a valid waiver
order, petitioner was entitled to a hearing, includ-
ing access by his counsel to the social records and
probation or similar reports which presumably are
considered by the court, and to a statement of
reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision.29 See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constiti-
tional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 THE SUPREmE
COURT REVEW 167, 183. The following language ap-
pears in Kent:
These contentions raise problems of substantial
concern as to the construction of and compliance
with the Juvenile Court Act. They also suggest
basic issues as to the justifiability of affording ajuvenile less protection than is accorded to adults
suspected of criminal offenses, particularly where,
as here, there is an absence of any indication that
the denial of rights available to adults was offset,
mitigated or explained by action of the Govern-
ment, as parens patriae, evidencing the special
solicitude for juveniles commanded by the juvenile
Court Act. However,... we do not pass upon these
questions.
383 U.S. at 551-52. The Court's language foreshadowed
Gault in another portion of the opinion:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable
purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in
recent years raise serious questions as to whether
actual performance measures well enough against
theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity
of the process from the reach of constitutional
guarantees applicable to adults.
Id. at 555.
30387 U.S. at 21. The Court was determined to
"candidly appraise" the claimed benefits derived
from the juvenile process.
31 Id. at 27.
stitutionally applicable to juvenile proceedings
through the fourteenth amendment: the right to
adequate notice of the charges; notification of the
right to be represented by counsel, or if indigent,
that counsel would be appointed; the privilege
against self-incrimination; and the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses.n It was the Court's
belief that this degree of "constitutional domestica-
tion" 11 would not adversely affect the unique bene-
fits derived from the juvenile courts.3 Second,
Gault was limited because it dealt solely with the
adjudicatory stage of the juvenile proceeding,
where facts are found and the juvenile is declared
delinquent.' 5
Despite the limited scope of the Gault holding,
the Court's analysis deflated myths surrounding
the juvenile court's operation and suggested paral-
lels between juvenile commitment and adult con-
finement. No longer could a state successfully argue
that a juvenile proceeding was "civil" when in
reality the commitment of adults and juveniles was
indistinguishable in terms of loss of liberty. If the
punishment was the same, in the sense that the
liberty of adults and juveniles was equally re-
strained, then due process safeguards afforded at
criminal trials should apply equally to juvenile
proceedings. But because Gault indicated that not
all due process safeguards need apply, difficult
questions remained. There was no indication how
far the "unique benefits" derived from flexible
juvenile proceedings justified departure from ordi-
nary criminal due process standards, nor was it ap-
parent whether the reasons for procedural safe-
guards in criminal trials had equal application in
the juvenile court context.
3 Id. at 31-57.
3Id. at 22.
M Id. at 21-23. As examples of the unique benefits,
the Court listed: separate processing and treatment of
adults and juveniles, juveniles are not labeled "crimi-
nals," juvenile court records are secret, and the pater-
nalistic nature of the proceedings. Id. at 22-27.
3 Id. at 13, where the Court states:
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of
these constitutional provisions [the fourteenth
amendment and the Bill of Rights] upon the to-
tality of the relationship of the juvenile and the
state. We do not even consider the entire process
relating to juvenile "delinquents." We consider
only the problems presented to us by this case.
These related to the proceedings by which a deter-
mination is made as to whether a juvenile is a
"delinquent". . . with the consequence that he
may be committed to a state institution.
The adjudicatory, or fact-finding, stage is usually sand-




Before the Gault decision, courts divided over the
issue of whether the proper quantum of proof in
delinquency proceedings must meet the civil stand-
ard (preponderance) or the higher criminal stand-
ard (reasonable doubt).36 Although the Supreme
Court did not confront the quantum of. proof
question in Gault, the Court's reasoning adapted
easily to the argument that the reasonable doubt
standard should be a due process requirement. That
argument was made in a number of cases following
Gault.
In an opinion handed down six months after
Gault was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court in
In re Urbasek" faced the issue of whether the
standard of proof in juvenile proceedings was to be
the civil "preponderance of the evidence" Is stand-
ard or the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" 11
standard. The court noted that none of the rights
specifically preserved by Gault had been denied
Urbasek, but felt that the "spirit" of Gault "logi-
cally require[d]" application of the reasonable
doubt standard when a charge alleges conduct
which would be a crime if committed by an adult.40
The court stressed that Gault had frequently
equated juvenile commitment with adult imprison-
ment and had concluded that the liberty of juvenile
and adult is equally restrained.4' The court also
reasoned that it would be inconsistent to grant
some due process rights to juveniles, such as right
to counsel and notice of the charges, but then to
deprive those rights of their "full efficacy" by fail-
ing to require the higher standard of proof.42
The Fourth Circuit reached the same result in
United States v. Costanzo.4 The court recognized
that Gault turned on the "loss of liberty for years"
and therefore, in terms of liberty, a juvenile court
adjudication was just as serious as a felony prose-
cution." Rejecting the argument that the juvenile
court proceeding was "civil," the court held that
11 See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1955).
38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
33 The preponderance of evidence rule is the stand-
ard of proof for civil cases. 9 J. Wioo1E, EVIDENCE
§2498 (3d ed. 1940).
39 The "beyond a reasonable doubt" test is applied
in criminal cases. 9 J. WimoMRE, EVIDENCE §2497 (3d
ed. 1940).
438 Ill.2d at 540-41, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
1 Id. The court observed that the liberty of incar-
cerated juveniles is restrained just as effectively as that
of adult prisoners.
4I2 d.
395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968).
"Id. at 444.
it must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of
the quantum of proof because of a possible four
year commitment. 45 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that if juveniles and adults were entitled to equal
treatment with regard to the Gault safeguards, then
the importance of the standard of proof as a pro-
tection required that it be applied to both adults
and juveniles.46
In State v. Santana,47 the Texas Supreme Court
also ruled on the quantum of proof issue, but unlike
the Costanzo and Urbasek courts, it held that the
reasonable doubt standard was not required in
juvenile proceedings.43 The court's opinion properly
characterized Gault as a limited decision which
announced that basic constitutional guaranties ap-
plied to juvenile proceedings. 49 The court then
stated its view that Gault's purpose was to make
certain that juvenile proceedings were "basically
fair." -0 By adhering to the preponderance of the
evidence standard, the majority felt it could insure
basic fairness and still comply with state legislative
policy. Implicit in the court's opinion was the
assumption that Texas juvenile courts conducted
basically fair proceedings and complied with the
literal dictates of Gault. However, the court failed
to analyze the impact of Gault on the quantum of
proof issue. The court did not inquire whether the
reasonable doubt test was an essential of due proc-
ess and fair treatment when an accused faces a loss
of liberty, nor did it ask if application of the reason-
able doubt test might adversely affect the juvenile
court's unique benefits.
Justice Pope, dissenting, concluded that the rea-
sonable doubt test should be adopted. His opinion
focused on the fact that Gault spoke only to the ad-
judicatory stage of the juvenile proceeding.u At
Is Id. The Court stated that no use of a "benign
label" can turn a four-year commitment into a civil
proceeding.
46 Id.
47 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969), vacated and remanded
sub nom., Santana v. Texas, 397 U.S. 596 (1970).
4"444 S.W.2d at 622.
41 Id. at 617.
50Id.
11 Id. The court observed:
The policy of the juvenile laws has been fixed by
the Texas legislature; and we conceive it to be our
duty to uphold the spirit of that law while at
the same time insuring to minors the basically fair
proceedings required by Gault and the Constitu-
tions of Texas and of the United States.
The dissent in Santana pointed out that the Texas
Juvenile Court Act did not require the preponderance
standard, nor did previous Texas Supreme Court
decisions. Id. at 628.52Id. at 623.
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that stage, Justice Pope noted, the juvenile court
"is at last a court; a court which sits to resolve
issues under principles of due process, which is the
best method yet devised for fair play." - Consider-
ing the basic role played by the reasonable doubt
test as an essential procedural safeguard to the
liberty of an accused in our system of jurisprudence,
he argued:
Liberty is our real concern. Perhaps no greater
harm could come to Santana than the State's mis-
guided efforts to rehabilitate him if, in fact, he is
innocent to begin with. His plea is that he wants
fairness first, therapy second.... The rights which
Gaidt accords a juvenile reduce the chances for
unfairness and injustice. The reason for the rea-
sonable doubt rule is no different.64
In another post-Gault case, W. v. Family Court,ss
the New York Court of Appeals held that the pre-
ponderance of evidence standard was sufficient in
juvenile proceedings." Largely ignoring the
changes introduced by Gault, the court relied on its
own previous decision 57 for the proposition that
juvenile proceedings were not criminal and there-
fore criminal safeguards did not apply.u However,
Gault had dearly specified that juvenile proceedings
must be regarded as criminal for some purposes. 5
9
Moreover, a recurrent theme had been that both
juvenile commitment and criminal punishment
must be regarded as a deprivation of liberty.6 The
New York court also doubted whether attorneys
could serve a useful purpose in juvenile proceedings,
while Gault had held that the right to counsel is
guaranteed to juveniles." The court again differed
Id. at 625.
1 Id. at 628.
5-24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d
414 (1969), rev'd sub nonm., In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970).
5624 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 257-58,
299 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
57 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
5s24 N.Y.2d at 198, 247 N.E.2d at 254-55,
299 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
59 387 U.S. at 49-50. The Court said that for the
purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination,
juvenile proceedings must be regarded as criminal
because "[flor this purpose, at least, commitment is a
deprivation of liberty." Id. at 50. Discussing the right
to counsel, the Court said: "A proceeding where the
issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delin-
quent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years
is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."
Id. at 36.60 Id. at 27, 29, 34, 36, 41, 50.
6124 N.Y.2d at 199, 247 N.E.2d at 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d
at 417. Compare the New York court's view uith the
Supreme Court's discussion in Gault of the importance
of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings, 387 U.S.
at 34-42.
with Gault when it contended that a delinquency
adjudication does not amount to a conviction 2
Further, the court characterized Kent and Gault
as "hard cases" and seemed to disregard them be-
cause they were atypical and injected undesirable
technicalities into the juvenile proceedings.1 ' Fi-
nally, the court feared that the extension of addi-
tional rights to juveniles would curtail the judges'
freedom and cause youths to escape treatment."
The court concluded that the preponderance stand-
ard was still the correct quantum of proof.'5
The decision in W. v. Family Court showed the
New York court's reluctance to impose further
procedural strictures on that state's juvenile
courts. 66 The court, reiterating the traditional view
that the juvenile process is "designed not as a
punishment but as salvation," 6 implied that the
juvenile system was already doing an adequate
job.1 ' Yet the clear import of Gault had been that
6124 N.Y.2d at 200, 247 N.E.2d at 255-56, 299
N.Y.S.2d at 417. Compare the New York court's view
with the Supreme Court's skeptical treatment of the
argument that juvenile proceedings are confidential,
387 U.S. at 24-25, and the Court's observation that
the "delinquency" status involves only slightly less
stigma than a "criminal" status, 387 U.S. at 24. The
Court also said that even if the delinquency status
involved no loss of civil rights, that benefit could
continue under revised procedures. 387 U.S. at 25.
63 24 N.Y.2d at 200-01, 247 N.E.2d at 256, 299
N.Y.S.2d at 418, where the court states: "The juvenile
court system, on the basis of that argument, has had
the singular misfortune of being impaled on the sharp
points of a few hard constitutional cases."64 1d. at 202, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at
419. Much like the early juvenile court reformers, the
court determined that if a child were given his rights,
his potential for good might be lost. This recalls the
notion that the judge should be able to prescribe treat-
ment for a child whether or not he had committed an
offense. See Fi.xNER & BALUwlN, supra note 6, at 6.
But if one accepts the Gault view of the seriousness of
commitment, a judge cannot commit children who are
innocent of any offense. E.g., State v. Santana, 444
S.W.2d at 628 (Pope, J., dissenting).
65 24 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 258, 299 N.Y.S.2d
at 420.66The premise underlying the New York court's
decision appeared to be its outdated conception of thejuvenile court as a clinic which operates free of criminal
law technicalities. Under that view, the specific reason
for the child's appearance before the court was less
important than his background leading up to his ap-
pearance. See note 6 supra. The Court of Appeals
restated arguments which traditionally sustained pro-
cedural flexibility in the juvenile courts, but Gault
had rendered most of those arguments untenable. See
the Supreme Court's treatment of the New York
court's arguments in Winslhip, 397 U.S. at 365-66.
67 24 N.Y.2d at 199, 247 N.E.2d at 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d
at 417.
68 The court found that "the juvenile court has pro-
foundly changed for the better the way children in
difficulty are treated by the public legal system." Id.
at 198, 247 N.E.2d at 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
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the performance of the juvenile court was unac-
ceptable insofar as it deprived youths of freedom
without regard for due process. The Supreme Court
repudiated the approach of the New York Court of
Appeals by reversing it in In re Winship. 9
The Court's decision in Winship is important not
only because it holds the reasonable doubt standard
applicable to juvenile proceedings, but also because
its analysis may be useful in determining whether
additional due process standards will be extended
to juvenile proceedings. The Court emphasized
that Gault focused solely on the adjudicatory stage
of the juvenile proceeding3° Gault had decided that
fourteenth amendment due process required the
application of the "essentials" of due process and
fair treatment at the adjudicatory stage.n Turning
to the quantum of proof issue, the Court inquired
whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is like-
wise an "essential" when a juvenile is charged
"with an act which would constitute a crime if com-
mitted by an adult." 7 2 The Court noted the vital
role played by the reasonable doubt standard in
the American scheme of criminal procedure 73 then
stressed that possible loss of the child's liberty de-
manded the highest standard of proofY4 It dis-
missed the argument that adoption of the reasona-
ble doubt test would risk destruction of the
beneficial aspects of juvenile proceedingsY5 The
0 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
70 Id. at 358-59.
7 Id. at 359.
72 Id.73 1d. at 361-64. To resolve any doubts as to the
constitutional status of the reasonable doubt test, the
Court specifically held that the test is incorporated in
the due process clause. Id: at 364. Among the reasons
for requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Justice
Brennan listed the following: the accused's interest in
not losing his liberty or being stigmatized by a convic-
tion, society's interest in not committing persons when
there is a reasonable doubt as to their guilt, and the
need to assure the community that the criminal law
operates fairly. See the discussion in the concurring
opinion of justice Harlan, 397 U.S. at 369-72.
' Id. at 368.
75 Id. at 366. Justice Harlan also listed a set of poli-
cies which would not be adversely affected by the adop-
tion of the reasonable doubt test. The reasonable doubt
test did not interfere with the worthy goal of rehabili-
tating the juvenile, make any difference in the extent
to which a youth is stigmatized as a criminal because
he has been found delinquent, or burden juvenile courts
with procedures making adjudications more time-con-
suming or rigid. Id. at 375. Justice Harlan's approach
differs from the Court's because he would balance the
interests of the juvenile against the interests of the
state in conducting simplified proceedings. The Court,
however, seemed to disregard the state's interest and
instead focused solely on the question of fairness to the
child and whether application of due process standards
will impair benefits derived by the child from juvenile
proceedings.
Court stressed that insofar as a finding of delin-
quency was still not tantamount to a criminal con-
viction, did not deprive a child of his civil rights,
and was carried out in a confidential proceeding,7 6
the beneficial character of the juvenile court was
retained. Gault had already declared that these
beneficial policies should be protected, but Winship
went farther, concluding with the cryptic phrase:
Nor will there be any effect on the informality,
flexibility, or speed of the hearing at which the
factfinding takes place.7
Indeed, the reasonable doubt test is not a pro-
cedural device at all, but merely an expression of
the degree of certainty required of the trier of fact.
The Court's mention of informality, flexibility, or
speed may be a simple recognition of the fact that
the reasonable doubt test entails no procedural
complexity. Alternatively, the Court might now
regard speed, informality and flexibility as interests
of the state which must be considered in applying
due process standards to juvenile proceedings.78
If that phrase were merely a recognition that the
reasonable doubt test will not complicate pro-
cedures, then Winship did not modify Gault. But
76Id. at 366-67. The Court also noted there would be
no impact on pre-adjudicatory or dispositional pro-
cedures.7 Id. at 366.
7Three considerations suggest that the Court did
not mean to apply the "speed, informality and flexi-
bility" criteria in future cases. First, Gault took into
account only the "substantive benefits" derived by the
child from juvenile proceedings for the purpose of
determining whether those benefits would be adversely
affected by the introduction of due process safeguards.
387 U.S. at 21. The Court's candid approach inquired
whether claimed benefits were actually substantive
benefits to the child. Id. at 21. Similarly, careful scru-
tiny should reveal that speed, informality and flexibility
are not substantive benefits to the child whose freedom
is at stake. Also, Gault seemed to recognize that in-
creased formality was not an objection to its holding,
provided the role of the juvenile judge was not altered.
Id. at 27. Second, Winship agreed with Gault that the
relevant question was whether the reasonable doubt
test would compel the states to abandon any of the
substantive benefits of the juvenile process. 397 U.S. at
367. Third, Justice Harlan concurred in Winship but
his approach differed considerably from the Court's.
See note 75 supra. Justice Harlan would not impose
standards which jeopardized the essential elements of
the state's purpose in creating juvenile courts. 397 U.S.
at 375. Consistent with that approach, standards are
unacceptable if they make adjudications more time-
consuming or rigid. The contrast between the Court's
approach, which focused on protecting substantive
benefit to the child and Justice Harlan's, which con-
siders the state's purpose in creating juvenile courts,
suggests that the Court will not apply the Harlan "rigid




if the Court intended to use "informality, flexibil-
ity, or speed" as a gloss on the "substantive bene-
fits" test of Gault, then Winship must be regarded
as a philosophical withdrawal from the policies of
Gault. To apply the "informality, flexibility, or
speed" test is to recognize the state's interests in
brevity and expediency at the expense of the child's
freedom. Gault regarded only benefits to the child,
not benefits to the state, as "substantive benefits"
worthy of preservation. If applied, the "informal-
ity, flexibility, or speed" test would militate against
adoption of additional due process rights in juvenile
proceedings, particularly the right to jury trial.7 9
JURY TRMAL
Before the Gault decision, most courts denied
juveniles the right to a jury trial at the delinquency
hearing, unless a statute provided otherwise80
Since Gault was handed down, numerous state and
federal courts have grappled with the issue of
whether a jury trial is a due process requirement in
juvenile proceedings, and a wide majority have
found it is not. The Supreme Court confronted the
9 See note 87 infra and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note the stances of the justices
who wrote separate opinions in Winsldp. Justice Har-
lan indicated he would object to procedural require-
ments which make adjudications more time-consuming
or rigid. 397 U.S. at 375. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Stewart appeared to resent the imposition of any
due process standards on the juvenile courts. Id. at
375-76. Justice Black could not agree with the Court
because in his view the entire Bill of Rights applies to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, but the
reasonable doubt test is mentioned nowhere in the Bill
of Rights. Id. at 377.
80 See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965).
"I Courts holding that the right to jury trial is not
required in juvenile proceedings include the following:
In re M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1(1969) (by implication); In re R., 12 Cal. App.3d 80,
90 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1970); In re C., 9 Cal. App.3d 255,
88 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1970); In re R.L., 3 Cal. App.3d 100,
83 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1969); In re T.R.S., 1 Cal. App.3d
178, 81 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1969); In re Presley, 47 Ill.2d
50, 264 N.E.2d 177 (1970); In re Jones, 46 Ill.2d 500,
263 N.E.2d 863 (1970); In re Fucini, 44 Ill.2d 305, 255
N.E.2d 380 (1970); Bible v. State, - Ind. -, 254
N.E.2d 319 (1970); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435
S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517,
255 A.2d 419 (1969); In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248
A.2d 364 (1968); Hopkins v. Youth Court, - Miss.
227 So.2d 282 (1969); DeBacker v. Sigler, 185 Neb.
352, 175 N.W.2d 912 (1970); In re Burrus, 4 N.C.
App. 523, 167 S.E.2d 454, a ff'd and modified, 275 N.C.
517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S.
1036 (1970); In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 174
S.E.2d 281 (1970); In re State ex rel. J.W., 106 N.J.
Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969),
aff'd per curiam, 57 N.J. 144, 270 A.2d 273 (1970);
In re D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d
704 (1970); In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 249 N.E.2d
808 (1969); In re Tsessmilles, 24 Ohio App.2d 153, 265
issue in DeBacker v. Brainard but refrained from
deciding 2 The jury trial issue is still vigorously
debated, and lower court decisions plus Winship
and Gault offer some insight into how the Court
might eventually resolve the question.
In denying juveniles the right to jury trial, many
state courts have expressed fears that a jury would
destroy the unique benefits derived from juvenile
N.E.2d 308 (1970); State v. Turner, 253 Ore. 235,
453 P.2d 910 (1969); In re Zorner, __ Ore. App. _. 475
P.2d 990 (1970), peitionfor cert.filed sub noma. Zorner v.
Oregon, 39 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1971) (No.
1452); In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350, prob.
Juris, noted sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 399
U.S. 925 (1970); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa.
Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967); Estes v. Superior Court,
73 Wash.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1970).
Cases indicating that the right to jury trial is required
in juvenile proceedings include the following: Nieves v.
United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508,
cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 28 (1969); Peyton v. Nord, 78
N.M. 717,437 P.2d 716 (1968); In re D., 34 App. Div.2d
41, 310 N.Y.S.2d 82, rev'd, 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d
627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970); In re Rindell, 2 BNA
CuM. L. REPm. 3121 (1968).
396 U.S. 28 (1969) (per curiam, petition for cer-
tiorari dismissed). The Nebraska Supreme Court had
faced the issue of the constitutionality of the statute
which provided that juvenile hearings be held without a
jury. The court voted 4-3 that the statute was uncon-
stitutional, but the Nebraska constitution requires the
concurrence of five judges before an act can be held
unconstitutional. DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461,
470, 161 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1968).
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not decide thejury trial issue because its decisions in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968), applying the jury trial requirement
to the states, were prospective only. E.g., DeStefano v.
Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). DeBacker's juvenile hear-
ing preceded the date of those decisions, so he was not
entitled to a jury trial, 396 U.S. at 30.
The Court also declined to rule on the burden of
proof issue because counsel for the juvenile admitted
that the evidence in the case was sufficient even under
the reasonable doubt standard. 396 U.S. at 31. Justice
Black's dissent in DeBacker restated his objection to
prospective-only rulings. He added his judgment that
Gaidt requires that juveniles be given the right to jury
trial because it is "one of the fundamental aspects of
criminal justice in the English-speaking world." 396
U.S. at 33-34 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas'
dissent agreed that DeSefano should have been retro-
active and that a jury trial is required in juvenile pro-
ceedings. His opinion rejected the reasoning of state
courts which denied the right to jury trial either because
it was not a fundamental right applicable to the states,
or because it was not consistent with the concept of thejuvenile court. Further, Douglas reasoned that the jury
trial is of such a fundamental nature that it should not
be denied to juveniles, and concluded with a sweeping
statement: "Where there is a criminal trial charging a
criminal offense, whether in conventional terms or in the
language of delinquency, all of the procedural require-
ments of the Constitution and Bill of Rights come into




proceedings. Few courts, however, have attempted
to define those benefits or to analyze thoroughly
the effect a jury would have. Although the Supreme
Court has not expressly undertaken an exhaustive
listing of benefits which are endemic to the juvenile
court setting, the Gault and Winship decisions
mentioned some benefits which might be endan-
gered by a jury trial.P First, it might be argued
that the benefit derived from confidential proceed-
ings is reduced if a jury is present. But that objec-
tion to a jury trial seems of little significance,
because doubts were expressed in Gault whether the
proceedings were confidential in factM and because
most courts refuse to admit the press. Second, a
jury trial could be viewed as having a debilitating
effect on the informal nature of the proceedings
associated with the juvenile court. The Supreme
Court, however, seriously questioned whether an
informal proceeding followed by punishment had
therapeutic value8 5 Further, the Court seemed un-
concerned with the prospect of added formality, so
long as nothing required "that the conception of
the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its oppo-
site." 88 Third, it is possible that a court might
regard Winship's phrase, "informality, flexibility,
or speed" as a benefit, and application of that
test would render unlikely the extension of the
jury right to juveniles.
In In re Fucinis the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the jury trial was not a constitutional require-
83In Gault, the state argued "that juveniles obtain
benefits from the special procedures applicable to them
which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of
the substance of normal due process." 387 U.S. at 21.
The Court agreed that substantive benefits should not
be displaced, but undertook its own candid appraisal
of these benefits. The Court mentioned: separate proc-
essing and treatment of adults and juves; children
are classified "delinquent" and not criminal"; 
t e de-
linquency status does not operate as a civil disability or
disqualification for civil service; the juvenile process
protects the child from disclosure of his deviational
behavior; and the juvenile benefits from informal court-
room procedure. Id. at 22-27. The Court cautioned
against assessing any of these benefits at face value,
particularly the benefit derived from informal court-
room procedure. Id. at 27.
For a list of the benefits mentioned in Winship, see
text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.81387 U.S. at 24-25.
"Id. at 26.
H Id. at 27.
87397 U.S. at 366.
*44 Ill.2d_305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970). In In re
Urbasek, 38 l.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967), the same
court held the reasonable doubt test applied to juvenile
proceedings, anticipating the Supreme Court's decision
in Winship by some three years. See text accompanying
note 37 supra.
ment in juvenile delinquency proceedings8 9 The
court found that Gault did not hold all adult rights
applicable to juvenile proceedings because such a
holding would strip those proceedings of their
unique benefits.90 Without naming any specific
benefits which would be adversely affected by a
jury trial, the court did state its objection to in-
creased "formality" in the proceeding. 91 As an addi-
tional basis for its decision, the court referred to
the Report of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, and
its Task Force Report, which cast doubt on the
necessity of jury trials for juveniles.92 The court
was thus persuaded that Gault had gone far enough
and, in light of Illinois' progressive juvenile court
legislation, a jury trial would simply add undesira-
ble formality to the proceedings."
Apparently, Fucini was based primarily on a
literal interpretation of Gault and an assessment
that the added formality occasioned by a jury
would serve no useful purpose.94 The court inter-
preted Gault as a limited decision which attempted
to work reform without stripping juvenile proceed-
ings of their unique benefits. No inquiry was made,
however, into the nature of those benefits, and the
court was therefore unable to determine whether a
jury trial would adversely affect the benefits de-
rived from juvenile proceedings. An additional
basis of Fucini was the finding that the added
formality occasioned by a jury would serve no use-
ful purpose. However, Gault intimated that added
formality in the proceeding is unobjectionable pro-
vided it does not seriously impair the judge's role.
In addition, the Illinois court apparently reached
its conclusion without asking, *as Gault requires,
whether a jury is an "essential of due process" or
89 44 Ill.2d at 308, 255 N.E.2d at 381.
90 Id. at 309, 255 N.E.2d at 382.91 !d.
1
2/d. at 309-10, 255 N.E.2d at 382.
93 The court also rejected the argument that the juve-
nile confronted a constitutionally impermissible choice.
It was argued that if in order to obtain a jury trial, thejuvenile waived juvenile proceedings and was tried as
an adult, he would be subject to a harsher penalty than
if he elected to be proceeded against as a juvenile. It was
this harsher penalty, petitioner continued, that caused
him to reject the option of a criminal trial and with it
his right to trial by jury. The court rejected the argu-
ment because it "didn't perceive" the coercive choice
and because it felt the option "to be proceeded againstcriminally should not work to defeat the beneficial
aspects of our [juvenile court] Act." Id. at 311, 255
N.E.2d at 383.
9 The court recognized that one of Gauls aims was
to avoid damaging the substantive benefits ddived from




whether the reasons for a jury trial apply in the
juvenile court setting.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the result
reached in Fucini is not necessarily inconsistent
with Gault.95 Gault can be adapted to arguments on
either side of the jury trial issue.96 By extending
the logic of the Supreme Court's finding that com-
mitment is a loss of liberty, it seems that the same
constitutional guaranties must be extended to
juveniles at the adjudicatory stage as are offered
to adults in criminal trials. On the other hand,
Gault quoted a passage from Kent which strongly
suggests that juveniles are not entitled to the same
protection as adults:
We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing
to be held must conform with all of the require-
ments of a criminal trial or even of the usual ad-
ministrative hearing, but we do hold that the hear-
ing must measure up to the essentials of due proc-
ess and fair treatment. 97
This uncertain limitation of the inevitable pro-
gression of the Supreme Court's logic is the source
of Gault's internal tension. Resolving this tension
means either limiting Gault to its holding, which
incorporated only four due process standards, or
extending Gault and disregarding any supposed
limitations. The critical unanswered question is the
nature of Gault's self-imposed limitation on the re-
quirements for due process in juvenile proceedings.
The tendency of most state courts facing the jury
trial issue has been to treat the limitation as a
strong prohibition against the extension of the jury
right to juveniles, perhaps because these courts
regard the jury as a serious encumbrance on the
juvenile system.
11 Gault did not pass on the jury trial question. The
Court gave consideration to only six issues and the
right to jury trial was not considered. 387 U.S. at 10.
It appears that petitioner did not raise the issue. See
petitioner's brief at 18 L. Ed. 2d 1522. In DeBacker v.
Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 469-70, 161 N.W.2d 508, 513(1968), the Nebraska court suggested that Gault may
have ignored the jury trial issue because the juvenile
was not charged with a serious offense.96See, e.g., Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp.
994, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court questioned
the dimensions of Gault:
"It is not altogether clear whether the Court was
referring to the same due process standards of the
Fourteenth Amendment as are required for state
criminal prosecutions,... or whether they were
embarking upon a new course of selective incor-
poration of those procedural guarantees suitable forjuvenile lcourt proceedings."
17 387 U.S. at 30.
Several other state courts have followed Illinois
in denying the right to jury trial in juvenile pro-
ceedings. A particularly thorough examination of
the jury trial issue was conducted by the Indiana
Supreme Court in Bible v. State.98 The Indiana
court, alert to the rapid changes in juvenile court
procedures, determined it would "re-examine the
question in light of the rccent body of law." 99 The
court first reviewed the history of the Indiana
juvenile court and the current Juvenile Court Act,
finding that the judge is intended to have great
flexibility in dealing with the juvenile. This flexi-
bility or informality was supposed to aid the child's
understanding of the court proceeding and to pro-
mote a meaningful relationship with the judge as a
compassionate authority figure. Further, it was
assumed that informality enabled the child to dis-
cuss his problems freely.' 0'
The Indiana court clearly regarded informality,
including the absence of a jury, as a benefit, but
each of its reasons for favoring informal procedure
can be strongly challenged. There is a serious differ-
ence of opinion whether informal procedure has
any therapeutic value.'0 Even if informal pro-
cedure is regarded as therapeutic, it may not be
of sufficient importance to justify a denial of
formal due process rights. Further, the court cited
no authority for its assertion that youths develop
meaningful relationships with the judge. Even if
such relationships do develop, a jury trial would
not necessarily destroy the opportunity for fatherly
guidance because the dispositional phase of the
proceeding seems well-suited to private discussions
between judge and juvenile 02 Finally, while the
court correctly stated that informality may en-
courage the child to discuss his problems, such dis-
cussion is out of place at the adjudicatory stage
where the sole issue is whether the youth com-
- Ind. -, 254 N.E.2d 319 (1970). Bible and
another youth were charged with assault and battery
and adjudged delinquent. Prior to the hearing, counsel
for the youths requested a jury trial but the motion
was denied. The sole issue raised on appeal was whether
there is a constitutional right to jury trial in juvenile
proceedings. Id. at -, 254 N.E.2d at 319-20.
11 Id. at , 254 N.E.2d at 322.
"00 Id. at __ 254 N.E.2d at 325.
191 Compare the Indiana court's belief that simplified
procedure has therapeutic value with Gaidt's statement
that recent studies suggest "the appearance as well as
the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-
in short, the essentials of due process-may be a more
impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as thejuvenile is concerned." 387 U.S. at 26.
102Id. at 27, noting that due process standards do
not apply at the dispositional stage.
[Vol. 62
JUVENILE COURTS
mitted the act with which he is charged. Again, the
dispositional, stage seems to be the proper setting
for such dialogue. Also, when a juvenile exercises
his right to remain silent, 103 this reason to favor
informality fails completely.
Aftersetting out the benefits of an informal pro-
ceeding, the Indiana court weighed them against
the considerations of Gault and Kent. Noting that
Gault had left the jury trial issue undecided,' the
court stressed the limitation of the Gault decision:
[Niothing in that opinion expressly or impliedly
says that all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
need necessarily be applicable....
On the contrary, we note a careful effort on the
part of that court to emphasize that it intended
no wholesale incorporation of the rights of adults
in criminal trials, into the juvenile system.'05
The court gave two reasons for denying the right
to a jury to juveniles. First, a jury trial would
destroy the important father-confessor role of the
juvenile court judge0 06 Second, a jury is not a
103 This right was guaranteed in Gault, id. at 55.
204__ Ind. at -, 254 N.E.2d at 325.105 Id. at , 254 N.E.2d at 326.
100 The court cited authorities which merely restated
the theoretical role played by the juvenile court judges.
Id. at _ 254 N.E.2d at 327. Gault, however, suggested
that the judge's role might not work benefit to the child.
387 U.S. at 26.
Gault's approach would also inquire into the actual
as opposed to the theoretical performance of the judge's
role. One might well ask whether crowded court calen-
dars preclude the establishment of a parental relation-
ship between judge and juvenile, at least at the adjudi-
catory stage. Recgonizing as Gault did that the concept
of a kindly judge should be retained, the question is
whether the presence of a jury would frustrate the
development of a relationship between the judge and the
child. The answer can be found in Gault's division of thejuvenile proceeding into three clear-cut stages, the pre-
adjudicatory, adjudicatory, and dispositional. Argu-
ably, Gault envisions a small scale criminal trial at the
adjudicatory hearing, because the goal of that hearing
is to make a fair finding of fact. But at the dispositional
stage, the judge is not bound by procedural strictures
and fatherly interaction can take place at that point. A
further answer can be seen in the Court's language:
While due process requirements will, in some in-
stances, introduce a degree of order... nothing
will require that the conception of the kindly juve-
nile court judge be replaced by its opposite, nor do
we here rule upon the question whether ordinary
due process requirements must be observed with
respect to hearings to determine the disposition of
the delinquent child.
Id. at 27 (emphasis added). The Court's language
suggests that the due process standard under considera-
tion is acceptable if it makes no attempt to replace
the judge's kindly role and that the dispositional hear-
ings offer an opportunity for a fatherly relationship to
develop.
demonstrably better fact finder than a judge 07
The court summed up:
This court takes the position that the presence of a
jury would interfere with the proper administra-
tion of the juvenile system without adding any
appreciable protection to tue rights of the
juvenile.Y'
The Indiana court, when faced with the choice
of following Gault's limitation or its logic, chose to
emphasize the limitation. Since the limitation of
the Gault decision indicates no standards for deter-
mining whether the requirements in a criminal
trial are compelled in a juvenile proceeding, the
results in both Bible and Fucini could hardly be
justified if the opinions had not stressed the bene-
fits derived from informal proceedings. But if
those benefits are illusory, the rationale for denying
a jury trial in juvenile proceedings grows dim. In
Gault, the Supreme Court said that the juvenile
hearing need not conform with all the requirements
of a criminal trial, but it also said that "the hear-
ing must measure up to the essentials of due process
and fair treatment." 109 Therefore, to the extent
that the right to jury trial is deemed an essential
of due process and fair treatment, it appears that
the jury right in juvenile proceedings is not pre-
cluded but rather mandated by Gault.
The approach of the Maryland Court of Appeals
in In re JohnsonnO also emphasized the limitation
of the Gault decision. Johnson was charged with
delinquency for allegedly kicking and striking a
police officer. After a hearing, the master recom-
mended Johnson be found delinquent. Defense
counsel filed a motion for a jury trial, but the
motion was denied and Johnson was placed on
indefinite probation. The appeal challenged the
constitutionality of the Maryland Juvenile Court
107 -id. at _, 254 N.E.2d at 327-28. The court
quoted from the Task Force Report, juvE.m DELnz-
QuENCY Ain YouTH Cpmu 328 (1967): "A jury trial
would inevitably bring a good deal more formality to
the juvenile court without giving the youngster a
demonstrably better factfinding process than trial
before a judge." See also Paulsen, Fairness to the Juve-
nile Offender, 41 Mum. L. REV. 547, 559 (1957), where
the same suggestion is made. But cf. Paulsen, supra
note 29, at 186, where it is acknowledged that some
adult protections, perhaps including the jury trial,
could be introduced without hampering the court's
operation.10s - Ind. at , 254 N.E.2d at 328.
109 387 U.S. at 30.
u0 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419 (1969).
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COMMENT
Act on the ground that it made no provision for
jury trials1 '
The Maryland court recognized that Gault held
some fourteenth amendment due process stand-
ards applicable to juvenile proceedings but,
"[w]hat the majority did not do was to say that
all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights need
necessarily be applicable." " 2 The court also ob-
served that Gault specifically approved certain
practices which distinguish adult proceedings
from juvenile proceedings, although the court did
not argue that a jury would interfere with any of
those practices. The court cited cases which char-
acterize Gault as a decision with a modest goal,
which was to leave juvenile hearings essentially
intact while making them "fairer" by applying
only a limited number of due process standards."
3
The legislature was left with the task of granting
juveniles the right to a jury trial." 4
Two other state court cases deserve mention
because they are under consideration by the Su-
preme Court. The approach used by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in In re Burrus"' was
straightforward and uncomplicated. The court
M Id. at 519, 255 A.2d at 420.
n2Id. at 524-25, 255 A.2d at 423.
2'in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super.
62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967), the juvenile was charged with
rape and apparently adjudged delinquent. On appeal,
petitioner argued that the Pennsylvania constitution
preserved the right to jury trial as it existed in 1790,
and that a juvenile charged with rape was entitled to ajury trial in 1790. The court rejected that argument, as
well as arguments based on the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. The court interpreted Gault as a carefully
limited opinion:
"In short, those who find in Gault the obliteration
of any distinctions between the treatment accordedjuveniles and adults are reaching a conclusion that
is unwarranted. It is clear to us that the Supreme
Court has properly attempted to strike a judicious
balance by injecting procedural orderliness into
the juvenile system."
Id. at 74, 234 A.2d at 15.
The jury trial issue was also raised in Dryden v.
Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968). The Dry-
den court recognized that Gault's logic seemed to require
a jury trial, but was unwilling to follow mere logic.
Instead, the court was of the opinion that a jury trial
would have an ill effect on the child's mind, even though
a bad experience before a jury is arguably insignificant
if the jury preserves the child's freedom. The court
also could not regard a jury as a better finder of fact
than a judge. Id. at 461. For a discussion of this "better
fact finder" contention, see Note, supra note 8, at 270-
73.
"- 254 Md. 531-32, 255 A.2d at 426-27.
11 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), cert. granted,
397 U.S. 1036 (1970). Barbara Burrus and some 45
other juveniles were taken into custody after they
failed to vacate a street and let traffic pass. At the
hearing, counsel demanded a jury trial but the request
was denied. Each juvenile was adjudged delinquent
and placed on probation.
simply found that its earlier decisions had uni-
formly denied the right to jury trial and that no
federal cases had held otherwise." 6
In contrast to Burrus, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in In re Terry'" recognized the internal
tension in Gault' and inquired whether Kent,
Gault, or the Constitution indicated that there
ought to be a jury trial in juvenile proceedings.
Turning to Duncan v. Louisiana,"9 the court
seemed to find support for the proposition that a
jury was not necessarily required."' After several
attempts at phrasing its inquiry, the court asked
whether distinctions between adult and juvenile
proceedings "render the right to a trial by jury
less essential" in the juvenile context." The court
found that several factors distinguish the adult
and juvenile court systems: the view juvenile
judges take of their role differs from the view
taken by criminal court judges; the juvenile sys-
tem makes better use of diagnostic and rehabili-
tative services; the end result of a delinquency
adjudication is less onerous than a finding of guilt;
a jury trial would disrupt the traditional character
of juvenile proceedings."' The court concluded
that a jury is not constitutionally compelled in
juvenile proceedings.
The Terry approach is considerably more subtle
than the Fucini or Bible approaches, inasmuch as
it stressed the logic of Gault as well as that de-
cision's limitations. The Pennsylvania court found
U6 275 N.C. at 528-29, 169 S.E.2d at 886.
"1 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350, prob. juris, noted sub
nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
' 438 Pa. at 343, 265 A.2d at 352.
-9 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Duncan held that the right tojury trial in serious criminal cases is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
20 438 Pa. at 345-46, 265 A.2d at 353. The Pennsyl-
vania court seemed to find in footnote 14 of Duncan,
391 U.S. at 149-50, a restriction on its holding that the
right to jury trial applies to the states. However, the
Pennsylvania court's finding is a strained interpreta-
tion of the Duncan footnote, because Duncan suggests
only that some judicial system might not use juries if
it provided alternative guaranties. Such guaranties,
however, are not part of the juvenile court system.
1' 438 Pa. at 348, 265 A.2d at 354.
"2Id. at 348-50, 265 A.2d at 354-55. Justice Cohen's
strong dissent in Terry challenged both the majority's
reading of Duncan and its attempt to sort out the fac-
tors which justify denial of the right to jury trial. Two
points made by the dissent are particularly significant.
In response to the majority's assertion that juvenile
courts use better rehabilitative services, Justice Cohen
argued that rehabilitation is irrelevant at the adjudica-
tory stage where the issue is simply whether the child
committed the act he is charged with. The majority
favored a flexible and informal juvenile proceeding, but
the dissent contended that the minimal benefit derived
from informality could not outweigh denial of the right
to jury trial. Id. at 352-54, 265 A.2d at 356-57.
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in Duncan an acknowledgment that a juvenile
court system which is separate from the criminal
court system might offer alternative protections
which replace the jury trial. Since the juvenile
court offers no such alternative protections, the
court inquired whether distinctions between the
criminal and juvenile systems justify omission of
a jury trial in the juvenile court. The distinctions
mentioned by the court, however, are not very
persuasive arguments for denial of the right to
jury trial.1 2 The court's strongest argument was
that a jury trial would disrupt the unique nature
of the juvenile process. But even if a jury trial
makes the hearing more formal, increased formality
is arguably irrelevant at a hearing with a purely
fact-finding purpose. Also, the flexible role of the
judge is fully retained at the dispositional stage.
Thus, despite the Terry court's thorough analysis
of the unique nature of the juvenile court, its
basis for denying the juvenile offender a trial by
jury is not compelling.
Since Gault was decided, only a handful of
courts have held that a jury trial must be made
available in juvenile proceedings.0 24 Of these few
decisions, the only original approach125 to the issue
is found in Nieves v. United Staes,'2 1 where the
court accepted a coercive choice argument in a
proceeding under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act2 Nieves was charged with violation of the
federal marijuana laws. If convicted as an adult,
M Id. at 351, 265 A.2d at 356 (dissenting opinion of
Coehn, J.).
'
12 See cases cited in note 81 supra.
12 The only state court case to rely on Duncan has
been DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d
508 (1968), discussed at note 82 supra. The court in
DeBacker phrased the issue as whether the right to ajury trial is an essential of due process at the adjudica-
tory stage. Relying heavily on Duncan, the court re-
fused to declare that the right to jury trial existed at
every juvenile hearing. Instead, the court found that
Gault could be interpreted to require a jury when a
youth is charged with an offense which would be
"serious" within the meaning of Duncan. rd. at 468-69,
161 N.W.2d at 512-13. For the latest word in Nebraska
on the jury trial issue, see DeBacker v. Sigler, 185 Neb.
352, 175 N.W.2d 912 (1970) (jury not required).
121280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
127 Nieves was arrested and charged with violating the
federal marijuana law. After the Attorney General
decided not to hold him for criminal trial, Nieves could
elect between a criminal trial and a juvenile hearing.
He chose the juvenile hearing and, as federal law dic-
tated, thus waived his right to a jury trial. Shortly after
Nieves pleaded in his delinquency proceedings, Gaulit
was decided. Nieves' counsel then moved to convene a
three judge panel, sought an injunction to prevent the
government from trying Nieves without a jury, and
asked for a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. §5033
(requiring waiver of the right to jury trial) was uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 996-97.
he was subject to a term of imprisonment of five
to twenty years, up to a $20,000 fine, would bear
the stigma of a criminal conviction, and on a
second offense could be imprisoned for ten to
forty years."' Nieves' alternative was a maximum
five year commitment as a juvenile delinquent, but
he could elect that alternative only if he waived
his right to a jury trial. The court felt the choice
Nieves faced was "coercive":
The alternatives presented exert strong pressure
on any juvenile defendant to waive his Sixth
Amendment right. Though he may well prefer to
have the trier of facts be a jury of twelve, the cost
of such an election is very nearly prohibitive. m
The court then held that because of the coercive
choice, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was
unconstitutional to the extent that it required the
juvenile to waive his right to jury trial in return
for a juvenile hearing.' 3' The court believed that
Gault supported its position that the statute was
unconstitutional. It reasoned that juvenile pro-
ceedings must be regarded as criminal for the
purpose of the sixth amendment right to jury
trial,"' just as Gault had regarded the proceedings
as criminal for the purpose of the privilege against
self-incrimination. 2
Turning to Gault and Winship, those opinions
have produced few decisional guidelines which
might be applied to the jury trial issue. Yet despite
the absence of express standards, Gault and Win-
ship do seem to offer two tests by which courts
are to determine which procedural rules involved
in the criminal court setting are to be adopted by
the juvenile court. The first test expressed in
"'8Id. at 1000.
129 Id.
ln Id. at 1001.131In Nieves, the government argued that Gault in-
tended to incorporate only a limited number of pro-
cedural guarantees. Defense counsel argued that Gault
intended to incorporate into juvenile proceedings all
the fourteenth amendment requirements for state
criminal trials. The court was not fully persuaded by
either argument, but the court did utilize the Gault
approach in finding that a delinquency proceeding
which might lead to a loss of liberty must be regarded
as a criminal prosecution for the purpose of the right
to jury trial. Gault had said juvenile proceedings must
be viewed as criminal for the purpose of the privilege
against self incrimination. 387 U.S. at 49. If the adop-
tion of a right turned on whether the proceedings were
labelled "civil" or "criminal," the Nieves court was
disposed to term them "criminal." The court was not
swayed by the argument that a jury would destroy the
informal atmosphere. Instead, the court noted that the
hearing could still be private and most juveniles would
probably waive their right to a jury anyway. 280 F.
Supp. at 1003-06.
= 387 U.S. at 49.
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Gault and Winship requires that an inquiry be
made as to whether a given safeguard, here the
jury trial, is an essential of due process and fair
treatment. With respect to an individual's right
to trial by jury, this inquiry is easily answered. In
light of Duncan v. Louisiana,3 which held the
sixth amendment guaranty of trial by jury applica-
ble to the states, it is incontestable that the jury
right is "fundamental to the American scheme of
justice" in serious criminal cases 34 Certainly, the
right to a jury is at least as "fundamental" as the
rights mentioned in Gault and Winship, but the
question remains whether the jury serves a useful
purpose in the juvenile court setting. The jury's
purposes, as articulated in Duncan, are to safe-
guard against arbitrary. action by judge or prosecu-
tor, to provide a check on the exercise of official
power, and in general to make judicial and pros-
ecutorial unfairness less likely' 35 Viewed in that
light, the jury appears to perform a necessary and
useful function in the juvenile court. 36 Therefore,
one might conclude that the jury is essential to
due process and fair treatment.
The second inquiry posed by Gault and Winship
is whether the incorporation of a given standard
would adversely affect the benefits derived from
the juvenile proceeding. In both cases, the state
argued that introduction of due process standards
would be damagingl"' and in both cases the Court
disagreed:
It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the
"- 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Duncan was convicted in
Louisiana of simple battery, an offense punishable by up
to two years in prison and a $300 fine. Duncan's request
for a jury trial was denied because the Louisiana consti-
tution granted the right to jury trial only in capital
cases or cases in which hard labor was a possible punish-
ment. Duncan's sentence was 60 days and a $150 fine.
The Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment
right to jury trial is embodied in the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 149. The opinion traced the history of the
right to jury trial, noting the "right to jury trial is
granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government." Id. at 155. The Court's
view was that the jury protects against biased judges
and corrupt or overzealous prosecutors, while lessening
the fear of unchecked official power. Finally, the Court
avoided defining a "serious criminal case" but did indi-
cate that the penalty authorized is of major relevance.
The Court merely decided that the penalty of two years
in prison authorized by the Louisiana assault statute
made the offense "serious." Id. at 161-62.
134 Id. at 149.
136 Id. at 156.
136 See, e.g., State v. Turner, 253 Ore. 235, 245, 453
P.2d 910, 915 (1969) (dissenting opinion of O'Connell,
J.): "the danger of arbitrary, corrupt or biased action
is just as great in juvenile proceedings as it is in adult
proceedings."
"' 387 U.S. at 21; 397 U.S. at 366.
special procedures applicable to them which more
than offset the disadvantages of denial of the sub-
stance of normal due process. As we shall discuss,
the observance of due process standards.., will
not compel the States to abandon or displace any
of the substantive benefits of the juvenile proc-
ess. But it is important, we think, that the claimed
benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly
appraised13 8
Thus, although the Court indicated that the states
need not give up the substantive benefits associ-
ated with the juvenile court, it nonetheless implied
that those benefits must be weighed or "candidly
appraised" in light of due process requirements.
In Gault, the Court engaged in just such a weigh-
ing test. Responding to the argument that intro-
duction of procedural safeguards into the juvenile
court setting would undermine the informality of
the proceeding, the Court suggested that due
process is more important than informality and
that some degree of order and regularity will not
displace the image of the kindly juvenile court
judge, particularly at the dispositional stage0 39
Thus, even if the juvenile derives some small re-
habilitative benefit from informal proceedings, it
appears that a jury trial would not destroy that
benefit, nor does it seem that such small benefit
can outweigh the possible disadvantage in terms
of loss of liberty caused by denial of the right to
jury trial.
The Court in Winship may have cast a shadow
on the weighing test proposed in Gault, however.
In Winship the Court stressed the fact that the
adoption of the reasonable doubt test would in no
way affect the "speed, informality or flexibility"
of the juvenile hearing. If the Court intended that
"speed, informality or flexibility" be non-negotia-
ble benefits of the juvenile court, it is unlikely that
the Court would be willing to extend the right to
a jury to juveniles. For, unlike the reasonable
doubt test, the jury trial would have substantial
impact on the speed, informality and flexibility of
the hearing. While the Gault and Winship opinions
reflect a desire to preserve the juvenile court's
substantive benefits, the Court has treated with
skepticism arguments which simply assert that
13 387 U.S. at 21.
"I' See Note, supra note 8, at 270:
A jury trial, however, would not affect the flexi-
bility of the dispositional phase of the delinquency
proceedings and would not interfere with the
judge's relationship to the child in the determina-
tion of proper disposition of the case. An adjudica-
tory hearing is designed to make an accurate deter-
uination of the facts and not to begin rehabilita-
tion of the youth.
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given features are beneficial.1 40 The states may
argue that a jury trial would destroy the benefit
derived from the juvenile court's informal proce-
dures, but a candid appraisal should reveal that
such benefit is not a sufficient justification for the
denial of the important right to a jury trial.
While the Winship Court's emphasis on speed,
informality and flexibility may be misplaced,
there are nevertheless several reasons why the
right to jury trial may not be applied to the juve-
nile court. For one, a jury trial can be time con-
suming and costly. This consideration is not articu-
lated in the state court opinions, although it may
be implicit in those opinions which express a
reluctance to overburden or formalize the juve-
nile court. In view of the juvenile court's recurrent
shortage of funds and overcrowded schedules, a
jury trial requirement could impair the already
limited effectiveness of the court's operations.
However, in states which provide for a jury trial
in juvenile proceedings, the right is usually
waivedju Even if a large number of jury demands
were anticipated, a jury might be made available
only to juveniles charged with violation of a
criminal statute.
104
Another consideration which might influence the
Court to deny juveniles the right to jury trial
relates to the limited nature of the Gault decision.
Gault did not mean to turn the delinquency hear-
ing into a criminal trial,14 but the Court has set
no limits on the incorporation of due process rights
in juvenile proceedings.jM Therefore the Court
could conceivably erect due process limits which
would deny juveniles the right to jury trial. But
the opposite result is more consistent with its
previous decisions. Adding the jury requirement
to the due process rights held applicable in Gault
and Winship still would not make the adjudicatory
hearing substantially the same as a criminal trial.
Gault's announced purpose was to secure fairness
at the adjudicatory hearing and a jury trial would
promote that end. Above all, Gault emphasized
that commitment amounts to a loss of liberty.
Juveniles are therefore logically entitled to the
140 387 U.S. at 21.
141 Note, supra note 8, at 273-74; Note, supra note
17, at 793-94 (in one city where jury trials are avail-
able, they are rarely requested); Nieves v. United
States, 280 F. Supp. at 1006.14 See Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457
(Ky. 1968) (concurring opinion of Miliken, J.).
M' 387 U.S. at 30.
1M Id. at 13-14: "there appears to be little current
dissent from the proposition that the Due Process
Clause has a role to play. The problem is to ascertain
the precise impact of the due process requirement upon
such proceedings."
protection afforded by those due process stand-
ards, such as a jury trial, which are solicitous of an
accused's freedom.
CONCLUSION
The Gault decision counts among its progeny a
wide variety of lower court cases, many of which
have sought to discover the limits of the Court's
opinion. One generalization to be drawn from
state court cases interpreting Gault is that their
emphasis is often on the limitation of Gault, even
though that limitation was not dearly mapped by
the Court. Rather, the Court has declared that
some criminal trial requirements are compulsory
in the juvenile court, others are not, but categoriza-
tion of any particular requirement must wait for
a case-by-case analysis. The Court's analysis
applied requirements which are essential to due
process and fair treatment and which do not offend
the unique benefits derived from the juvenile pro-
ceeding. In Winship, the Court adopted the same
approach, with the conceivable but crucial varia-
tion that it was willing to protect the state's in-
terest in flexible and speedy proceedings from in-
vasion by due process strictures. Both of the
Court's decisions have applied solely to the ad-
judicatory stage of the juvenile proceeding.
Post-Gault decisions do not portend a return to
criminal trials for children. Instead, the goal of
the Court has been to achieve fairness in the hear-
ing at which facts are found. The decisions have
attempted to assure that no child will be declared
delinquent and committed to an institution with-
out a fair finding of fact. Beyond the fact-finding
stage, the juvenile court judge retains wide latitude
in determining the disposition and treatment for
the youth who has been declared delinquent. Thus,
it is at the dispositional stage that the unique
flexibility of the juvenile court is still fully opera-
tive. Despite the well-documented failure of the
juvenile court, its dispositional flexibility and the
potential for improved treatment of youths mean
that the court retains a hope of providing the
type of rehabilitation sought by turn of the century
reformers.
Editor's Note: After this article went to press,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971),
holding that a trial by jury is not constitutionally
required in state court proceedings. The Court
denied that the jury "is a necessary component of
accurate fact finding" and expressed concern that
the jury might impair the juvenile court's opera-
tion. Id at 1985.
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"NO KNOCK" SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CRIME ACT: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Before a police officer may break and enter a
dwelling, he must reveal to the occupants his
identity and the purpose of his entrance.i The
recently enacted District of Columbia Court Re-
form and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,2 how-
ever, permits the police to disregard this customary
rule of criminal procedure and carry out what has
been labeled "no knock" searches and seizures;
under certain circumstances, the police may break
and enter a house without giving an announce-
ment of their identity and purpose.'
Since announcement of identity and purpose is
not a procedural nicety, but a rule fashioned to
ensure the individual's privacy,4 his safety and the
safety of the police,5 this attempt in the District
I See text accompanying notes 14-18 infra.2 Pub. L. No. 91-358 (July 29, 1970). [hereinafter
cited as District of Columbia Crime Act].
'Pub. L. No. 91-358, §23-591(c) states:
(c) An announcement of identity and purpose
shall not be required prior to such breaking and
entry-(1) if the warrant expressly authorizes break-
ing and entering without such a prior an-
nouncement, or
(2) if circumstances known to such officer or
person at the time of breaking and entry, but,
in the case of the excecution of a warrant, un-
known to the applicant when applying for such
warrant, give him probable cause to believe
that-(A) such notice is likely to result in the
evidence subject to seizure being easily
and quickly destroyed or disposed of,
(B) such notice is likely to endanger the
life or safety of the officer or another per-
son,
(C) such notice is likely to enable the party
to be arrested to escape, or(D) such notice would be a useless gesture.
4 Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, in Mil-
ler v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (footnote
omitted) stated:
The requirement of prior notice of authority and
purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply
rooted in our heritage and should not be given
grudging application. Congress, codifying a tradi-
tion embedded in Anglo-American law, has de-
dared in 118 U.S.C.] §3109 the reverence of the law
for the individual's right of privacy in his house.
Every householder, the good and the bad, the
guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protec-
tion designed to secure the common interest
against unlawful invasion of the house.
5 Justice Brennan noted that compliance with the
announcement requirement safeguards law enforcement
officers who might otherwise be mistakenly shot as
of Columbia Crime Act to prescribe those circum-
stances in which announcement need not be given
created a considerable division of opinion in Con-
gress as to the constitutionality of the provision.
Proponents of the Act felt the "no knock" search
and seizure section did not change existing law,
but rather codified it.' They argued that the pro-
vision was a safeguard which would actually pro-
tect the individual from unauthorized police in-
trusions by dearly defining those circumstances in
which an unannounced entry can be made7 and
by requiring, if possible, prior judicial authoriza-
tion for such an entry."
On the other hand, some members of Congress
felt the "no knock" provision was clearly uncon-
stitutional. They believed the Act would greatly
increase those circumstances in which unannounced
prowlers. Id. at 313 n. 12; Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 57-58 (1963). Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 460-61 (1948) (concurring opinion of Jackson,J.).
6 H.R. REP. No. 1303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1970)
(Conference Report on the District of Columbia Crime
Bill). See 116 CoNG. REc. S12021 (daily ed. July 23,
1970) where Senator Symington stated:
Police officers today, on their own authority, can
enter premises to serve search or arrest warrants
without first knocking and announcing their iden-
tity when justified by certain circumstances. The
District of Columbia crime report provision on
no-knock warrants does not give police officers this
authority. They already have it.
7 Senatory Tydings, sponsor of the bill in the Senate,
stated:
In the judgment of the Senate conferees, it is far
better to have the limited exceptions to the knock-
and-wait rule spelled out and frozen on the statute
books, instead of leaving the exceptions to grow
in a disordered fashion and to change in Federal
and local case law. It is far better to have the
limited exceptions spelled out clearly, statutorily,
for the police to observe, instead of leaving police
officers as at present to their own devices.
116 CONG. R c. S11685 (daily ed. July 17, 1970).
8
In fact, this bill adds a very significant additional
protection for privacy not contained in those prior
(Supreme Court) decisions or in the law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia today: prior judicial supervision
of no-knock entry in every possible case. It is a far
better proposal insofar as the point of view of civil
libertarians is concerned than presently exists
under the law of the land as decided by the Su-
preme Court.
116 CONG. REc. S11569 (daily ed. July 16, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Tydings).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
entries would be permitted, thereby violating the
fourth amendment's9 protection from unreasonable
search and seizure. They feared that such a statute
would violate the individual's right of privacy,'
increase violence," and serve as a prototype for
national legislation12 which could be used to sup-
press dissent."
9 U.S. CoNsT., Amend. VI:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The minority view in the House Report on the Dis-
trict of Columbia Crime Act stated:
The "no-knock" provision authorizing unan-
nounced entry into homes of private citizens by
policemen is a radical, unwarranted departure from
existing law. Its need has been undocumented, its
grant of authority too extensive, its language un-
conscionably vague, its standards undefined and
its safeguards illusory. If enacted, it will effec-
tively render Fourth Amendment guarantees
against "unreasonable searches and seizure" null
and void in the District of Columbia.
H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1970).
See 116 CONG. R.c. 511607 (daily ed. July 16, 1970)(statement by Senator Bayh); 116 CONG. REc. S12024(daily ed. July 23, 1970) (Senator Nelson).
10
I am afraid I will acquire high blood pressure,
because it almost gives me high blood pressure to
hear it solemnly advocated in the Congress of the
United States that we do away with the boast in
our law that a man's home is his castle and that we
allow officers of the law and make it legal for officers
of the law to enter houses of our citizens in like
manner to that in which burglars now and have al-
ready entered them.
116 CONG. REc. S11647 (daily ed. July 17, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Ervin).
The no-knock proposal is couched in terms of
prevention of violence. But think for a moment
what will occur when policemen charge into citi-
zens' homes, any time, day or night. Consider the
deadly weapons and attack trained dogs available
to many District of Columbia residents, and the
likely response of an average citizen when someone
he probably would not know who, breaks into his
home in the middle of the night. No-knock means
extreme physical danger to all of us, including the
police.
116 CONG. REc. §11845 (daily ed. July 21, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator McGovern). See 116 CONG Rac.
S11829 (daily ed. July 21, 1970) (remarks of Senator
Young).
12 Subsequent to the passage of the District of Colum-
bia Crime Act, the Controlled Substances Act of 1970
which provides no-knock search powers for federal
narcotics agents was enacted. Pub. L. No. 91-513
§509(b) (Oct. 27, 1970).
13
It should be clear, moreover, that no-knock au-
thority which they now intend to have used against
the perpetrators of crime may someday be used,
This comment will compare those circumstances
in which it has been held that the police may dis-
pense with the customary announcement of iden-
tity and purpose, under the fourth amendment,
with those in which the District of Columbia
Crime Act allows such an unannounced entry. It
will be seen that the Supreme Court has not clearly
specified what circumstances and what standard
of proof can justify such an entry and that state
and lower federal courts, while in agreement as to
what exceptions exist to the rule of announcement
of identity and purpose, also vary as to the stand-
ard of proof needed to support those exceptions.
An examination of the statute itself will reveal that
it has codified what various courts have found to
be constitutionally permissible exceptions to the
requirement of announcement of identity and pur-
pose. The "no knock" search and seizure provision
will likely be construed to be constitutional under
the fourth amendment, with a properly narrow
interpretation.
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The right to have a police officer announce his
identity and purpose before breaking and entering
a person's home has long been a part of the Anglo-
American tradition of search and seizure' 4 As early
as 1603, the English courts recognized this in
Semayne's Case.'5
In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff
(if the doors be not open) may break the party's
house, either to arrest him, or to do other execu-
tion of the K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify
under a different administration, against them by
those who would deny their elementary rights to
dissent. This no-knock legislation, which serves as
the potential prototype for national no-knock
legislation, can be used to suppress the right of a
citizen legitimately to keep arms, and to suppress
the right of dissent of one who perceives his govern-
ment drifting too much toward either the right or
the left.
116 CONG. REc. S11751 (daily ed. July 20, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Goodell.).
14 For a discussion of the English common law on this
issue, see Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-09
(1958); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 459-
62 (1949); Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant, 22
MIcH L. Rnv. 798, 800-06 (1924); Blakey, The Rule of
Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United
States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 499,
500-04 (1964); Note, Announcement in Police Entries,
80 Yar.x L. J. 139, 140-45 (1970).
15 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (Ex. 1603).
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the cause of his coming, and to make request to
open doors.
16
Either by judicial decision or by statute 7 the
states have followed this common law requirement.
Likewise, federal law makes announcement of
identity and purpose a prerequisite to an entry.Y
But in spite of its long history and wide adoption,
the giving of announcement has never been con-
sidered an absolute necessity for making a lawful
entry. In the words of the Washington Supreme
Court:
To require strict compliance with a 'knock and
wait' rule in the execution of search warrants, no
matter what the circumstances, would hamper
the orderly enforcement of criminal law.19
The Supreme Court has only recently considered
the necessity of announcing authority and purpose
befor entry in the leading cases of Miller v. United
Stales"0 and Ker v. California2 While in Ker the
Court concluded that the fourth amendment of
the Constitution normally demands announce-
ment of both authority and purpose before a
search and seizure may lawfully be carried out by
either state or federal officials, in neither case did
the Court clearly delineate what circumstances or
conditions would permit law enforcement officers
to dispense with this constitutional requirement.
In Miller v. United States, petitioner was ar-
rested by out-of-uniform Washington, D.C. police
who entered his apartment at 3:45 a.m. on the
1
6 Id. at 195.
17 ror a list of state requirements as to announce-
ment of identity and purpose before entry, see 116
CONr. REc. S11922-23 (daily ed. July 22, 1970). See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §844, 1531; FLA. STAT. §933.09;
Mlcrt. STAT. ANN. §28-1259(6).
"The applicable federal statute is 18 U.S.C. §3109
(1964), which governs execution of warrants by federal
officers:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door
or window of a house, or any part of a house,
or anything therein, to execute a search warrant,
if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate
himself or a person aiding him in the execution of
the warrant.
Although the statute only refers to search warrants, it
has been held that the validity of an entry to effect an
arrest without a warrant is tested by identical criteria.
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 588 (1968);
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1965).
19State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217, 455 P.2d
595, 598 (1969).
20 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
21374 U.S. 23 (1963). On two other occasions, the
Court considered the announcement issue. See Sabbath
v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968), note 39 infra;
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), note
23 infra.
belief that he was selling narcotics. In carrying out
the arrest the police knocked and stated, "Police."
Petitioner started to open his door, then attempted
to shut it. The policemen ripped off the chain
securing the door, entered the apartment, and
arrested him. No announcement of purpose was
ever made. Petitioner was subsequently convicted
under federal narcotics laws.
The Supreme Court reversed Miller's conviction
on the ground that the police had failed to an-
nounce their purpose as required by District of
Columbia law.2 The Court did not reach the con-
stitutional problems raised by unannounced entry,
however. Justice Brennan, speaking for the ma-
jority, recognized that at least one exception
existed 2 to the requirement of 18 U.S.C. §3109
"2Justice Brennan began the decision by stating that
the validity of an arrest by state officers for a federal
crime is to be determined by state law. Therefore, the
arrest of the petitioner ought to be governed by the
law of Washington, D.C. as stated in Accarino v. United
States, 179 F.2d 456, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 357 U.S. at
305-06. In Accarino the court held that the common law
was that before an officer can break open a door to a
home, he must make known the cause of his demand
for entry. The court therefore applied this rule to the
District of Columbia. Brennan said that since the
Accarino decision was identical to the federal statute,
18 U.S.C. §3109, the case warranted review in spite of
the Court's policy not to interfer with local rules of law
fashioned by the District of Columbia courts. Id. at
305-06.
23 Brennan did acknowledge that some state decisions
had held noncompliance with the announcement rulejustifiable in exigent circumstances, such as when the
officers in good faith believe "they or someone within"
is in peril of bodily harm, or that the person to be ar-
rested is fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence.
The Court, however, refused to rule on any qualifica-
tions to §3109 as there were no exigent circumstances
present in Miller. Id. at 309.
Any doubt whether the Court actually recognized
the useless gesture exception is cleared up in Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) where the virtual
certainty test was again used by the Court. Brennan,
writing for the majority, stated that the facts did not
create a virtual certainty or extraordinary circum-
stances which might have justified lack of announce-
ment. Their narcotics agents had information that
Blackie Toy, who operated a laundry on Leavenworth
Street. was selling heroin. They went to a laundry
owned by James Wah Toy (nothing indicated that the
two were the same) and knocked. When Toy appeared
at the door, the agent said he had come to pick up some
laundry, to which Toy responded that he should come
back later. The agent then announced he was an agent
and showed his badge. Toy slammed the door and ran
down the hall, and the agents entered and arrested
him. Brennan said there was no extraordinary circum-
stances present, such as imminent destruction of evi-
dence, and that Toy's flight was ambiguous conduct
which did not create a virtual certainty. Justice Clark,
joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart and White, dis-
sented, saying the flight was evidence the agents'
purpose was known and created exigent circumstances.
[Vol. 62
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
that notice of authority and purpose be given
before entry.24 He stated,
It may be that, without an express announcement
of purpose, the facts known to officers would justify
them in being virtually certain that the petitioner
already knows their purpose so that announcement
would be a useless gesture.25
The Court concluded that the facts in Miller were
not such as would justify the use of this exception
to the general rule of announcement. It considered
petitioner's attempt to shut the door after seeing
the officers an ambiguous act, not one which would
prove petitioner knew of their purpose. It was the
expected reaction of any citizen having this experi-
ence at that hour in the morning, especially when
the officers were not in uniform.26
Ker v. California27 was the next leading decision
concerning the announcement requirement. Los
Angeles County sheriff's police believed petitioner
was selling marijuana secured from one Ronnie
Murphy. On the night in question, the police ob-
served a meeting between these two. They then
tried to follow petitioner until they lost him after
he made a U-turn. The officers went to his apart-
ment, obtained a passkey, and entered without
announcing their identity or purpose. They claimed
that they did this because it had been their experi-
ence that an announcement resulted in the sus-
pected person's attempt to destroy the evidence.28
Once inside the officers found the marijuana and
arrested petitioner. Ker was convicted for posses-
sion of marijuana.
In this case, unlike Miller, the Court directed its
attention to the constitutional questions raised by
unannounced entry. Although petitioner's con-
viction was upheld, the Court, due to a 4-4-1
split,29 did not clarify those circumstances which
2 1 It must be remembered that the Court was decid-
ing this case in its supervisory capacity over a federal
statute and not on constitutional standards. 357 U.S.
at 306; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963).
25 357 U.S. at 310.
26 In a dissenting opinion Justice Clark, joined by
Justice Burton, felt that the circumstances created a
virtual certainty that petitioner knew of the officer's
purpose. "Rather than attempting to psychoanalyze
petitioner, we should measure his understanding by
his outward acts." Id. at 318 (Clark, J., dissenting).
This appears to be what Brennan required, also. The
two apparently differed only about what circumstances
create a virtual certainty. This disagreement over
what factual situations would justify noncompliance
with announcement had important repercussions in
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
27374 U.S. 23 (1963).28Id. at 28.
would constitutionally justify an unannounced
entry. Eight of the nine justices did agree that
some circumstances would necessitate breaking
and entering without notice"0 but they divided 4-4
as to what they were.
Justice Clark, voting to affirm, noted that Cali-
fornia law allowed exceptions to the notice re-
quirement when exigent circumstances existed. 1
Citing People v. Maddox2 as recognizing exceptions
when announcement would endanger the officer or
frustrate the arrest, Clark said:
Here justification for the officers' failure to give
notice is uniquely present. In addition to the offi-
cers' belief that Ker was in possession of narcotics,
which could be quickly and easily destroyed, Ker's
furtive conduct in eluding them shortly before the
arrest was ground for the belief that he might well
have been expecting the policePn
Clark therefore held that the entry was not un-
reasonable under the fourth amendment as applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
justice Brennan disagreed with this conclusion,
but he recognized that there were certain instances
when an unannounced intrusion by police would
not violate the fourth amendment:
(1) where the persons within already know of the
officers' authority and purpose, or (2) where the
officers are justified in the belief that persons
within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or
(3) where those within, made aware of the presence
29Justices Clark, Black, Stewart and White agreed
that announcement was not needed. Mr. Justice
Harlan concurred in the result only. Justice Brennan
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice War-
ren and Justices Douglas and Goldberg concurred,
which stated the unannounced entry violated the
fourth amendment.
30 374 U.S. at 40 (opinion of Clark, J.), 47 (opinion of
Brennan, J.).
In concurring in affirmance of the conviction, justice
Harlan stated that state searches and seizures should
be subject to the "fundamental fairness" test of the
fourteenth amendment rather than the more rigid
"reasonableness" test of the fourth amendment. Judg-
ing under such a standard, Harlan felt the search of
Ker's apartment was within constitutional bounds.1 CAL. PENAL CODE §844 (West 1970) reads:
To make an arrest... in all cases a peace officer,
may break open the door or window of the house in
which the person to be arrested is, or in which
they have reasonable grounds for believing him to
be, after having demanded admittance and ex-
plained the purpose for which admittance is de-
sired.judicial exceptions to this, however, were recognized
in People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
32 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
374 U.S. at 40 (opinion of Clark, J.).
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of someone outside (because, for example, there has
been a knock at the door), are then engaged in
activity which justifies the officers in the belief
that an escape or the destruction of evidence is
being attempted.Y
Applying these exceptions to the facts of Ker,
Brennan criticized Clark's opinion for allowing an
exception based on the mere conjecture that those
within might have been expecting the police. The
U-turn made by petitioner while the police were
following him, which Clark felt was reason to be-
lieve that petitioner might well have been expect-
ing the police, could be no more than an ambiguous
act
3 5
Brennan also attacked what he regarded as
Clark's main ground for holding that lack of an-
nouncement was justified, the belief that someone
within was destroying evidence.36 He emphasized
that the evidence showed that no one inside knew
policemen were there and that there was no activ-
ity in the apartment to justify the officers' belief
that someone was attempting to destroy evidence.
To Brennan, the fact that it has been the officers'
experience that other narcotic suspects had de-
stroyed evidence when announcement of identity
and purpose was made was not enough to meet
fourth amendment requirements."
Since Ker, the Supreme Court has only con-
sidered the issue of announcement in Sabbath v.
United States s Like Miller and Ker, Sabbath in-
volved a conviction for violating narcotics laws.
Customs agents followed Jones, an informer who
was known to be carrying illegally imported nar-
cotics, to the petitioner Sabbath's apartment.
After knocking and failing to receive a response,
the agents entered the unlocked door without
announcement, arrested petitioner without a
warrant, and found the narcotics.
Rejecting the Government's contention that
announcement might have endangered informant
Jones or the officers, the Court, per Justice Mar-
shall, reversed the conviction and held that there
was no evidence to show that petitioner was armed
or would resist arrest. This reversal, however, did
nothing more than demonstrate some circum-
stances which may not be used to justify an un-
announced entry. The Court did not attempt to
answer the more general question of what it con-
14Id. at 47 (opinion of Brennan, J.).31 Id. at 60.
36 ld. at 61.
'
7 Id. at 61-63.
391 U.S. 585 (1968).
sidered to be possible exceptions to the announce-
ment rule or reconcile the divided opinions in Ker39
Further, as in Miller, the Court confined its anal-
ysis to statutory intepretation and decided the
case without reaching the level of constitutional
adjudication.
Thus, the Supreme Court has never satisfac-
torily indicated what it considers to be constitu-
tionally permissible exceptions to the requirement
of announcing identity and purpose before entry.
It is therefore necessary to look to what lower
courts have held to be sufficient to justify an un-
announced entry.
LowER COuRT DECISIONS
In general, the state and lower federal courts
have recognized three basic categories of exceptions
to the customary requirement that announcement
of identity and purpose be made by police prior to
breaking and entering. These are 1) where there is
danger to the officer or another person, 2) where
announcement would frustrate the purpose of
entry either by destruction of evidence or escape,
and 3) where authority and purpose are already
known. These courts, however, have been incon-
sistent in defining what standard of proof is needed
to justify one of these exceptions or what set of
facts will satisfy this standard.
As early as 1822, state law recognized that when
there was imminent danger to the officer, an excep-
tion existed to the general requirement of an-
nouncement of identity and purpose.40 In Read v.
31 Justice Marshall did make a statement in a foot-
note on the announcement issue:
Exceptions to any possible constitutional rule
relating to announcement and entry have been
recognized, see Ker v. California... (opinion of
Brennan, J.) and there is little reason why those
limited exceptions might not also apply to §3109,
since they existed at common law, of which the
statute is a codification.
Id. at 591 n. 8. But it is difficult to justify Marshall's
comment that Brennan's exceptions to the requirement
of notice of identity and purpose were recognized in
Ker, a 4-4-1 decision. Certainly Brennan's view on
those circumstances which justify an unannounced
entry should be given no more weight than Clark's.
Also, Marshall's footnote stated that the exceptions
listed by Brennan in Ker were those that existed at
common law, but a review of the common law as it has
developed in lower courts shows that the courts do not
completely agree as to what the common law is. See
text accompanying notes 40-76 infra.
0 There seems to be no question that an unan-
nounced entry can be made where a party within is in
danger. Even Brennan did not question this in Ker.
374 U.S. at 47. One such case is Wayne v. United
States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S.
860 (1963), which upheld an unannounced entry after
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Case,4' where the appellant resolved to resist cus-
tody even if it resulted in bloodshed, the court
stated that the sheriff was not "obliged by law to
make a demand, that would probably issue in the
destruction of his life." 42 More recent cases,
43 
of
which People v. Maddox" is the leading decision,
have held to the same effect. In Maddox, the police
went to appellant's home on the strong belief
that he was selling heroin. Upon knocking, the
officers heard retreating footsteps. They kicked
open the door and entered without stating their
identity or purpose. Justice Trayner, in announc-
ing that judicial qualifications had been engrafted
onto the California statute 5 requiring notice of
identity and purpose, said,
since the demand and explanation requirements of
section 844 are a codification of the common law,
they may reasonably be interpreted as limited by
the common law rules that compliance is not re-
quired if the officer's peril would have been in-
creased or the arrest frustrated had he demanded
entrance and stated his purpose.... When as in
this case, he [the officer] has reasonable grounds
to believe a felony is being committed and hears
retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his peril
would be increased or that the felon would escape
if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose,
is not unreasonable."
Thus, American case law does not require an-
nouncement of identity and purpose if it would
endanger the officer, but his conclusion to make
an unannounced entry must be based on some
standard. Such phrases as "good faith belief" 4 or
prolonged knocking when the victim of an illegal abor-
tion was believed to be dying inside. See People v.
Wojciechowski, 31 App. Div.2d 658, 296 N.Y.S.2d 524
(1968).14 Conn. 166 (1822).42 The court assumed that this was true and stated
that the jury should have been informed that if the
safety of the sheriff was in danger, the lack of announce-
ment was lawful. Id. at 170.
"1 Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.
1966), cerl denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967) (defendant an
armed murderer); People v. Hammond, 54 Cal.2d 846,
357 P.2d 289, 9 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1960) (Defendant had a
gun and was under the influence of heroin); People v.
Robinson, 296 Cal. App.2d 789, 75 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1969)(Shots had been fired in vicinity of appellant's apart-
ment); State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 211 A.2d 359 (1965)
(appellant suspected of murder); State v. Johnson, 102
R.I. 344, 230 A.2d 831 (1967) (defendant convicted of a
crime of violence).
446 Cal.2d 301, 294, P.2d 6 (1956).
41See CAL. PENAL CODE §844 (West 1970), the text
of which is at note 31 supra.
46 46 Cal.2d at 306, 294 P.2d at 9.
47 Id.
"reasonable belief" 4 have been used to denote
what that standard is, but the facts of the cases
which apply those tests demonstrate that a wide
variety of circumstances have been held to justify
an unannounced entry. For instance, suspicious
sounds emanating from the apartment after the
police had made their presence known was suffici-
ent to warrant an unannounced entry in Maddox.
Justice Traynor stated that the police could reason-
ably conclude, on hearing retreating footsteps
after knocking, that their safety was in danger.49
It should be noted that there was no evidence that
appellant was armed or vicious. In other cases the
violent nature of the crime for which the appellant
was being sought was enough to cause the courts
to conclude that there was probable cause for
belief of increased peril.5" On the other hand, a
record for a non-violent crime or an unconfirmed
report of an armed person inside the dwelling has
been held not to create reasonable belief that the
officer was in danger.51
The second exception recognized by lower courts
is when the object of the entrance would be frus-
trated by announcement-that either the evidence
sought would be destroyed or the person to be
arrested would escape. The courts, however, have
been unable to agree what evidence is necessary to
demonstrate the exigent circumstances which per-
mit an unannounced entry. Two different ap-
proaches have been developed. Some courts have
concluded that an officer's prior experience and
the nature of the evidence sought can lead to the
reasonable conclusion that the evidence is likely
to be destroyed, thereby excusing announcement. 2
Others have rejected this "blanket rule," 53 which
could cover all easily destructible items, and have
held that only the particular circumstances at the
48 United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837, 846
(E.D. Pa. 1962), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967);
United States v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251, 257 (D. Md.
1964); People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558, 260 N.E.2d
815, 312 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1970).
49 46 Cal.2d at 306-07, 294 P.2d at 9.
'1 See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967); United
States v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1964).
"United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
"2See People v. Hartfield, 94 Ill. App.2d 421, 237
N.E.2d 193, 197-98 (1968); Henson v. State, 236 Md.
518, 204 A.2d 516,519-20 (1964); State -. Johnson, 102
R.I. 344, 230 A.2d 831, 836-37 (1967). Each case in-
volved narcotics which could be easily destroyed.
13Justice Traynor used this term in People v. Gas-
telo, 67 Cal.2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10
(1967), to describe that rule which would allow an un-




time of entry could lead the officer to reasonably
conclude that evidence was being disposed of. 4
A compromise approach as to when an unan-
nounced entry may be made to prevent the de-
struction of evidence has been adopted by at
least five states, New York,5 5 Minnesota, 56 Ne-
"
4See Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715, 718
(9th Cir. 1967) (easily destructible gambling materials);
United States v. Blank, 251 F. Supp. 166, 174 (N.D.
Ohio 1966) (gambling materials); State v. Mendoza,
104 Ariz. 395, 399, 454 P.2d 140, 144 (1969) (narcotics);
Commonwealth v. DeMichel, - Pa. __ __, 277 A.2d
159, 164 (1971) (gambling materials); Commonwealth
v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 448, 240 A.2d 795, 798 (1968)
(gambling materials).
This approach, however, does not discount the nature
of the evidence. In fact it would appear to be a neces-
sary element in determining when an unannounced
entry would be reasonable. Thus, if the evidence were
such that it could be disposed of quickly and the officers
heard suspicious movement after they had somehow
made their presence known, courts would conclude that
compliance was not necessary. But, if the evidence was
not easily destructible, say a large piece of furniture,
suspicious noises would not justify an unannounced
entry. State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 215, 455 P.2d
595, 597 (1969).
The breadth of the "blanket rule" and the possibility
of abuse under it have led at least one jurisdiction,
California, to clarify its position as to what evidence is
necessary in order to justify an unannounced entry.
In Maddox, Justice Traynor had noted that the sound
of retreating footsteps created a good faith belief that
evidence would be destroyed. 46 Cal.2d at 306, 294
P.2d at 9. After that case, however, the appellate courts
of California upheld unannounced entrances on no more
basis than that experience had shown the evidence could
be easily destroyed. Many of these cases were denied
hearings by the Supreme Court of California. For a de-
tailed list of cases, see People v. De Santiago, 71
Cal.2d 18, 25-26, 453 P.2d 353, 357-58, 76 Cal. Rptr.
809, 813-14 (1969). In People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d
586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967), Justice
Traynor abruptly halted the growth of such a standard.
He made it clear that compliance with California Penal
Code §844 would not be excused by a "blanket rule"
stating that announcement is unnecessary just because
the evidence could be easily destroyed. Only where par-
ticular circumstances give rise to a reasonable belief
that immediate action is necessary to prevent destruc-
tion would an unannounced entry be held lawful. Id. at
588-89, 432 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12.55 N.Y. CODE CRn P. §799 (McKinney 1964) pro-
vides:
The officer may break open an outer or inner door
or window of a building, or any part of the building,
or any thing therein, to execute the warrant, (a) if,
after notice of his authority and purpose, he be re-
fused admittance, or (b) without notice of his au-
thority and purpose, if the judge ... issuing the
warrant has inserted a direction therein that the
officer executing it shall not be required to give
such notice. The judge... may so direct only upon
proof under oath, to his satisfaction, that the prop-
erty sought may be easily and quickly destroyed
... or that danger to the life or limb of the officer
or another may result, if such notice were to be
given.
56 Minnesota arrived at a similar result as New York
braska, 57 South Dakota,- and Utah. 9 These states
require that a warrant permitting an unannounced
entry be obtained from a magistrate or judge before
such an entry may be made. The result, however,
appears to be that a "blanket rule" has been
maintained as a matter of judicial instead of police
discretion. This was demonstrated in People v.
DeLago,60 where the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of section 799 of the
New York Code of Criminal Procedure. 6' The
court stated that the proof required by the statute
to excuse announcement was shown merely by an
affidavit describing the evidence, which was of
such a nature that the court could take judicial
notice that it could be easily destroyed.62
While state and lower federal courts disagree as
to what facts are sufficient to warrant a conclusion
that evidence may be destroyed, these courts ap-
pear to be more consistent as to when the pos-
sibility of escape would warrant a failure to
announce. As with the destruction of evidence
exception, suspicious noises emanating from the
suspect's apartmentO or unusual conduct by the
suspectf4 have been held sufficient to allow a con-
clusion that an escape would be attempted. There-
fore, the police could legally dispense with an-
nouncement. But unlike the destruction of evidence
exception, it does not appear that the courts will
condone an unannounced entry made on the basis
of prior experience. A previous record of trying to
by judicial decision. In State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127,
166 N.W.2d 347 (1969), the court stated it would fol-
low the New York rule requiring a warrant permitting
an unannounced entry. The affidavit must provide sub-
stantial basis for believing evidence will be destroyed.
Some relevant factors to be considered are, 1) the in-
tensity of surveillance, 2) reliability of the informant,
3) corroborating evidence, and 4) criminal record of the
defendant. Id. at 136, 166 N.W.2d at 353.
5NEB. REv. STAT. §29-441 (Supp. 1967).
"S.D. Corn'. LAW §§39-17-125 (Supp. 1970).
'9 UTAH CODE A aN. §§77-54-9 (1967).
60 16 N.Y.2d 289, 213 N.E.2d 659, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353
(1962), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966).61 See note 55 supra.
65 16 N.Y.2d at 292, 213 N.E.2d at 661, 266 N.Y.S.2d
at 356.
6 People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6
(1956) (retreating footsteps after the police had
knocked); State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 211 A.2d 359
(1965) (noise in apartment after arrival of police in
building).
64 Vanella v. United States, 371 F.2d 50 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967) (Running out
back door after police knocked and then going back in




escape6s or eluding an officer6 s has been held to be
inadequate to justify an unannounced entry.
A third classification of circumstances which
courts have held would justify noncompliance
with the general rule requiring announcement of
identity hnd purpose before entry is when an-
nouncement would be a useless gesture. Generally,
circumstances which indicate that those within
already know the identity and purpose of the
officer have been required.n The rationale for such
an exception is, as Judge Burger (now Chief Jus-
tice) stated, "To require that in these circum-
stances the police officer expressly state a purpose
to apprehend the quarry he is pursuing would be
to hamper law enforcement with a useless for-
malism." 11 The courts have found this exception
to apply to a variety of circumstances, such as
where the police heard a flurry of activity after
announcing their identity,69 where the police were
in pursuit of two suspected robbers who had
entered an apartment,71 or where the defendant
could see the police and knew of their purposeY
A further type of circumstance which has been
classified as a useless gesture is where the police
are certain that an announced entry would not be
heard. This might be where the police had no
reason to know that someone was inside72 or where
they could see that the defendant remained asleep
and, despite repeated knocking, could not hear a
statement of identity and purpose. 3
The difficulty with the useless gesture exception
is what degree of proof the police must have that
their identity and purpose are already known or
would not be heard. State and federal courts have
not been consistent in their holdings. Some have
required that the police be "virtually certain" 74
Is People v. De Santiago, 71 Cal.2d 18, 453 P.2d 353,
76 Cal Rptr. 809 (1969).66 People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558, 563, 260 N.E.2d
815, 817, 312 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (1970) (Defendant had
once eluded an officer).
17 Wilgus, supra note 14, at 802.
c3 Chappell v. United States, 342 F.2d 935, 938 n. 4(D.C. Cir. 1965).
11 Commonwealth v. McAleese, 214 Pa. Super. 228
252 A.2d 380 (1969).
70 Chappell v. United States, 342 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1965).71 People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855(1955).
72Howe v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. 302 (1849) (Sheriff
had no reason to know that anyone was inside church
when he broke in to serve a writ of attachment).
7 Bosley v. United States, 426 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
74 Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir.1961); United States ex rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F.
that their identity and purpose were known to the
occupants before entry. Others have been less
stringent and have allowed the exception where
the facts created a "reasonable belief" 75 or that
the police were "justified" 71 in believing that
identity and purpose were known.
ExAMAT oN OF SEcTio N 2 3-591(c)
District of Columbia Code §23-591(c), which its
supporters state is no more than a codification of
current law,7 authorizes police to break and enter,"
without announcing their identity and purpose, by
two means: 1) when the circumstances known to
the officer at the time of entering, and unknown
when applying for a warrant, give him probable
cause to believe that an announcement is likely to
result in one of three situations or be a useless
gesture, or 2) when the warrant expressly permits
it.7 In light of the above review of Supreme Court
decisions and those of the lower courts, it appears
that this statute does provide exceptions to the
normal rule of announcement which have been
recognized by some courts, and furthermore, that
these exceptions are permissible under the fourth
amendment.8 0
One important criticism of both methods of
making an unannounced entry under the District
of Columbia Crime Act is the standard of proof
used in the Act to determine when an unannounced
entry may be made. The statute states that when
there is "probable cause" to believe that one of
the enumerated circumstances "is likely" 81 to
occur, such an entry is permissible. Some members
of Congress felt this standard did not meet the
Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa.1, af'd, 401 F.2d 765 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. McAleese, 214 Pa. Super. 228, 252 A.2d380 (1969).
7s Dagamput v. United States, 352 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1965), cerl. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966).76 United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963).
7 See note 6 supra.78 Breaking and entering are defined in §23-591(e)
as including any use of physical force or violence or
other unauthorized entry but do not include entry ob-
tained by trick or stratagem. This reflects current case
law where entrance by deception, as long as force was
not employed, has been held to be permissible. Smith v.
United States, 357 F.2d 486, 488 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1966);
Leaky v. United States, 272 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir.
1959).
79 D.C. CODE ENCYCL. A2w. §2 3 -591(c).
80 See Note, supra note 14 (Conlcudes the statute is
constitutional but states its use must be stringently re-
stricted if its administration is to meet constitutional
standards).81D.C. CODE ENcycL. ANN. §23-591(c).
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fourth amendment's requirement of probable
cause82 but on examination this standard does not
appear to violate the fourth amendment, as it has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court. The
phrase "probable cause... is likely to" was ex-
tractedn from Justice Clark's opinion in Ker v.
California,"4 where, in justifying the unannounced
entry in that case, he stated,
The officers had reason to act quickly because of
Ker's furtive conduct and the likelihood that the
marijuana would be distributed or hidden before a
warrant could be obtained .... 85
Further, this phrase, as used by Clark and on
which the statute is based, does not seem to differ
from the definition of probable cause as defined in
Brinegar v. United States.85 There the Court stated
that probable cause existed where
the facts and circumstances within their [the offi-
cers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being com-
mitted.P
In other words, all that is needed for fourth amend-
ment probable cause is that there be a reasonable
ground to believe that an event will occur,3 or, to
use the terminology of Ker, there is a likelihood
that something will happen.
The District of Columbia Crime Act appears,
therefore, to demand no less strict a standard then
that defined in Brinegar. The Act requires that
there be probable cause that evidence is likely to
be destroyed, an individual's safety is likely to be
endangered, or the suspect is likely to escape.
82 Senator Goodell stated:
Let it be clear that the standard created by the con-joining of probable cause with "likelihood" is a new
one, a weaker one than that of "probable cause"
conjoined with "will", and a departure from the
intent of Ker.
116 CONG. REc. S11750 (daily ed. July 20, 1970). See
116 CONG. REc. S11829 (daily ed. July 21, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Young).
By using the words "probable cause" and "is likely
to," the House Committee on the District of Columbia
Crime Act felt it was complying with particularity
standards set forth in Ker, 374 U.S. at 42. H.R. REP.
No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1970). This was also
the opinion of the Conference Committee. 116 CONG.
REc. S11607 (daily ed. July 16, 1970).
84374 U.S. 23 (1963).851 Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
86 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
8Id. at 175-76 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 175.
Only a reasonable belief or likelihood that these
enumerated situations will occur is required.
The first procedure authorizing unannounced
entry under the District of Columbia Act may
apply to one of four situations. The first such
situation is when the "circumstances known to
such officer or person at the time of breaking and
entry ... give him probable cause to believe that
such notice is likely to result in the evidence sub-
ject to seizure being easily and quickly destroyed
or disposed of." 8 9 Both the Supreme Court 0 and
lower federal and state courts9' have recognized
this exception. The only constitutional difficulty
with this part of the statute is the evidentiary
question of whether the nature of the evidence
alone is enough to warrant an unannounced entry.
The statute itself does not indicate whether it
would be, but only speaks in the general terms of
"circumstances known at the time" of entry. The
legislative history is likewise unclear on this issue.92
If the statute could be construed, however, to
mean that the nature of the evidence would be
sufficient to justify an unannounced entry, such a
construction would not violate the fourth amend-
ment. There is authority both from the Supreme
Court, in Ker v. California,93 and in the lower
courts94 for a "blanket rule" which would permit
an unannounced entry under such circumstances.
There would seem to be no constitutional reason
to declare an unannounced entry unreasonable
under such a standard. Under modem conditions,
the difference of a few seconds caused by announce-
ment could mean that evidence such as narcotics
89 D.C. CODE ENcycL. ANN. §23-591(c)(2)(A).
90 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 40 (opinion of Clark,
J.), 47 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
91 See text accompanying notes 52-62 supra.
12The House Report on the District of Columbia
Crime Act indicates that if it is the officer's experience
that the evidence will be destroyed, he may make an
unannounced entry. H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 106 (1970). On the other hand, Sen. Tydings
stated:
The Senate conferees did not recede from their
original position that only particular facts... may
serve as grounds for "no-knocking." The House
conferees urged to the contrary that particular
facts are unnecessary; they urged, for example,
that "no-knocking" would be appropriate in
nearly all narcotics or gambling cases, based on
the destructibility of the evidence usually involved.
The issue was resolved in favor of neutral language,
adaptable to either the House or the Senate inter-
pretation; but with the limitation of specific ref-
erence to the Ker case.
116 CONG. Rxc. S11607 (daily ed. July 16, 1970).
93374 U.S. at 40 (opinion of Clark, J.).
94 See note 52 supra.
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or gambling materials" would be disposed of before
the police would have time to reach them. As long
as the circumstances surrounding the entrance are
such that the type of evidence creates probable
cause that announcement would enable the occu-
pants to destroy it," then the fourth amendment
should permit an unannounced entry to be made.
The second situation which would excuse notice
of identity and purpose before entry is when the
"circumstances known to such officer or person at
96 In 1962, for example, it was reported that less than
30 seconds were necessary to destroy all of the evi-
dence of a wire service headquarters. McClellan,
Gambling and Organized Crime, S. REP. No. 1310,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. Experience has shown that
numbers bets are recorded on either "flash" paper
which ignites on contact with fire or "water solu-
ble" paper which dissolves on contact with water,
and that the time spent by the executing officer in
giving notice and waiting to be refused admittance
is used by the gambler to destroy his work product.
H.R. REP, No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1970). In
refering to narcotics, the House Report said:
The same is true in the area of illegal narcotics ac-
tivity. Experience has shown that the time con-
sumed by the executing officers in announcing their
authority and purpose and waiting to be refused
admittance is used by the drug trafficker in dis-
posing of his narcotics down the toilet.
Id. at 109. Several suggestions have been made as to
how to stop this destruction. One commentator has
expressed the opinion that announcement of identity
and purpose has become outmoded with the techno-
logical revolution. He stated:
the perfection of small firearms and the develop-
ment of indoor plumbing through which evidence
can quickly be destroyed have made [18 U.S.C.]
section 3109 a dangerous anachronism. In many
situations today where bandits are captured only
after long gun battles with police, a rule requing
officers to forfeit the valuable element of surprise
seems senseless and dangerous.
Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the
Criminal Law, 49 CAL. L. REv. 502 (1961).
Another alternative was proposed by Rep. Gal-
lagher. He introduced a "no flush" law which would
ban indoor plumbing in the District of Columbia. In so
doing, he stated, "I would rather opt for liberty than
indoor plumbing." 116 CONG. REc. H2071 (daily ed.
March 19, 1970).
96 Senator Tydings gave an example of when an un-
announced entry would be permissible based on the
nature of the evidence.
In gambling cases, if it is known... that the pro-
spective defendants regularly use water soluble
paper, that they conduct their operations near a
disposal facility, that they have defeated searches
previously by immediately and effectively dispos-
ing of all evidence upon receiving preentry notice
from the police, and that the prospective defend-
ants are aware of the police surveillance and are
primed to effect the disposal of the evidence [it
may be permissible to depart from the knock and
wait rule].
116 CONG. REc. S11685-6 (daily ed. July 17, 1970).
the time of breaking and entry.. . give him prob-
able cause to believe that such notice is likely to
endanger the life or safety of the officer or another
person." 17 There can be no constitutional objection
to this provision. Reasonable conduct under the
fourth amendment does not require that an inno-
cent party be injured. Neither the Supreme Court s
nor the lower courts99 have indicated that an-
nouncement need be made if the safety of a third
party would be endangered. Furthermore, lower
court decisions since Read v. Case'00 have clearly
held that if the officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that his safety is in danger, announcement
may also be excused.
The third exception to the requirement of an-
nouncing identity and purpose before entry pro-
vided for by the District of Columbia Crime Act is
"if circumstances known to such officer or person
at the time of breaking and entry... give him
probable cause to believe that such notice is likely
to enable the party to be arrested to escape." "I
There is no question that an exception of this
nature exists if there is probable cause that the
suspect will escape; again both the Supreme
Court 0 2 and lower courts have so indicated.'0
The final set of circumstances which would per-
mit the police to enter without stating their iden-
tity and purpose is if such notice would be a
"useless gesture." 0 4 Senator Tydings, chief spon-
sor of the District of Columbia Crime Act, defined
this term as used in the Act as follows:
The term "useless gesture" under the conference
substitute is specifically utilized as a legal term of
art, with narrow and exclusive reference to prevail-
ing case law. In this way the term is restricted to
situations as where the officers' identity and pur-
pose are already known to the occupant of the
premises to be searched, or as where the occupant
has failed to respond to a knock on the door and is
known to be asleep and incapable of being given
notice.'05
As so defined, this exception would be constitu-
0 ' D.C. CODE ENcYcL. ANN. §23-591(c)(2)(B).
98Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47.
99 See note 40 supra.
100 4 Conn. 166; see note 42 supra.
'
01D.C. CoDE ENcc.. ANN. §23-591(c)(2)(C).
202 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47.
103 See notes 63-64 supra.
'
04D.C. CoDE ENcYcL. AsN. §23-591(c)(2)(D).
'05 116 CONG. REc. S11685 (daily ed. July 17, 1970).
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tionally acceptable. It has a precise meaning' 6
which conforms to the common law definition." 7
One problem, however, with the useless gesture
exception, as used in the District of Columbia
Crime Act, is whether probable cause is an ade-
quate standard to determine when the exception
applies."'8 The Supreme Court in Miller v. United
States"°9 used the term "virtual certainty" as the
standard which must be met before an unan-
nounced entry could take place under this excep-
tion"' and lower courts have held likewise."'
However, other courts have used what appears to
be a less strict standard such as "might well have"
known" 2 or "reasonable belief." "1 These appear
to be in accord with probable cause as used by the
District of Columbia Crime Act and the fourth
amendment.
The second procedure by which the police may
make an unannounced entry under the District of
Columbia Crime Act is if the warrant authorizing
the search and seizure expressly states that the
policeman may do so."4 Authorization by warrant
is the preferred procedure under the Act, since the
officer can only make an unannounced entry with-
out judicial approval if the circumstances per-
mitting an unannounced entry were unknown at
the time the warrant was applied for. However,
the issuing judge cannot permit such an entry to
take place at whim; he is held to the same stand-
10 In Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926), the Supreme Court commented
on its criteria for certainty:
the decisions of the court upholding statutes as
sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion
that they employed words or phrases having a
technical or other special meaning, well enough
known to enable those within their reach to cor-
rectly apply them.., or a well-settled common
law meaning, notwithstanding an element of de-
gree in the definition as to which estimates might
differ.
The useless gesture exception would seem to meet this
criterion.
"07 See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
10Senator Javits remarked:
It seems apparent that the use of the words "vir-
tually certain" by the Supreme Court meant to re-
strict the scope of the "useless gesture" doctrine.
The conference bill dispenses with an announce-
ment if the officer had probable cause to believe
that it would be a "useless gesture," but says
nothing about virtual certainty. This seems to go
beyond the doctrine referred to in the Miller case.
116 CONG. Rzc. S11928 (daily ed. July 22, 1970).
09 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
"1 Id. at 310.
"' See note 74 supra.
52374 U.S. at 40.
s See note 75 supra.
'D.C. CoDE EN c YcL. ANN. §2 3-591c)(1)
ard as the policeman who makes an unannounced
entry under the Act without a warrant. The judge
must find there is probable cause that one of the
four situations described above is likely to exist if
announcement is given." 5
By providing for judicial approval of unan-
nounced entries, the Conference Committee on the
District of Columbia Crime Act felt there would
be additional protection to the individual from
illegal entries" 6 This belief is based on the theory
that it is better to have a neutral, detached judge
determine when the privacy of the home may be
invaded, rather than have a policeman do it."7
Such an impartial judgment is obviously a wise
policy when referring to whether a search and
seizure can be made. However, the need for a
judge's approval would seem to contradict the
rationale for permitting unannounced entries, that
they should only be made in exigent circumstances
or where purpose and identity are already knownY
Since exigent means calling for immediate atten-
tion, the term would seem to preclude those situa-
tions which are known far enough in advance to
U5 The applicable provision for search warrants is
§23-522 (c) (2):(c) The application for a search warrant may also
contain -
(2) a request that the search warrant authorize
the executing officer to break and enter dwell-
ing houses or other buildings or vehicles to be
searched without giving notice of his identity
and purpose, upon probable cause to believe
that one of the conditions set forth in sub-
paragraph (A), (B), or (D) of section 23-591(c)(2) is likely to exist at the time and place at
which such warrant is to be executed.
That for arrest warrants is found in §23-561(b)(1):
If the complaint established probable cause to be-
lieve that one of the conditions set out in subpara-
graphs (A) through (D) of section 23-591(c)(2) is
likely to exist at the time and place at which such
warrant is to be executed, the warrant may contain
an authorization that it be executed as provided in
section 23-591.
"16H.R. REP. No. 1303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 236
(1970).11 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56
(1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948).
118
I think if we authorize no-knocks under these cir-
cumstances, with advance determination by a
court,... we shall be opening a Pandora's box. It
will broaden the whole concept, at least temporarily
until the courts decree it unconstitutional, of the
limitation on no-knock entries.
By definition, a court cannot, in advance, deter-
mine exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances
are circumstances that arise on the spot, observed
and assessed by the officer on the spot.
116 CONG. REc. S11750 (daily ed. July 20, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Goodell).
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permit a warrant to be obtained. The fallacy of
such an argument, however, lies in the fact that
the underlying rationale of making unannounced
entries is not exigent circumstances which require
immediate action, but rather necessitous circum-
stances which require making an unannounced
entry to avoid certain undesirable results. A judge
would be able to determine whether a necessitous
situation exists at a time prior to entry. For in-
stance, he could tell if the evidence sought was of
a nature which could be easily destroyed and
whether there was a likelihood that it would be,
or if it was known that the suspect was armed and
the officer's life would be in danger.
Judicial authorization of unannounced entries
is, therefore, an additional protection against un-
warranted entries without notice and not an un-
constitutional expansion of "no knock" search and
seizure. It leaves the decision of whether to an-
nounce identity and purpose to the police only
where a warrantless search is permissible or where
the occupant's conduct at the time of entry would
create a situation permitting an unannounced
entry.
CONCLUSION
The "no knock" search and seizure section of
the District of Columbia Crime Act is a contro-
versial provision." 9 The controversy results from
fear that §23-591(c) unconstitutionally extends the
common law exceptions to the requirement of
announcement of both identity and purpose before
law enforcement officers can enter an individual's
home. Whether these fears are well founded re-
mains a questionable issue. At the present time
the case law is inconclusive due to the even split
of the Supreme Court in the leading case of Ker v.
Caliornia'" as tw when the exceptions exist and a
similar division among the state and lower federal
courts.
Despite this inconclusiveness by the courts, the
District of Columbia Crime Act seems to provide
for entries permissible under the fourth amend-
ment. Strong objection was raised that the "prob-
able cause ... is likely to" 121 standard of proof
provided by the statute for determining when an
unannounced entry may be made does not meet
the fourth amendment's requirement of probable
cause 22 However, probable cause as defined by
M9 See notes 6-13 supra.
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
121 See note 82 supra.
'
22The fourth amendment states in part, "no war-
rants shall issue. but unon nrobable cause."
the Supreme Court in Brinegar v. United States
appears to be consistent with this phrase 23 Both
state that there must be reasonable, but not cer-
tain, grounds for the officer's belief, and this is all
that is required by the fourth amendment.
Those sections of the District of Columbia Crime
Act which allow an unannounced entry when there
is probable cause that notice is likely to imperil
the officer or a third party or is likely to allow the
suspect to escape are undoubtedly constitutional.
These exceptions have long been recognized, and
the proof needed to establish them is adequate
under the fourth amendment.
The constitutionality of the destruction of evi-
dence exception, the useless gesture exception and
the judicial authorization provision seems less
certain. These provisions, however, do meet fourth
amendment standards. Opposition to the destruc-
tion of evidence exception centers around the
question of whether the nature of the evidence
itself is enough to justify an unannounced entry.
Some lower courts, as well as Justice Clark in
Ker, have felt that it could be enough in certain
instances, and there is no constitutional reason
why the so-called "blanket rule," as used in the
District of Columbia Crime Act, should not be
upheld. A reasonable man might well believe that
announcement would result in certain kinds of
evidence being destroyed.
The controversy over the useless gesture excep-
tion is likewise based on unfounded fears. Oppo-
nents to the Act felt that probable cause is not as
strict a standard as the "virtual certainty" te-
used in Miller v. United States."4 But the Supreme
Court in Brinegar, as well as lower federal and
state courts, has regarded the probable cause
standard of proof sufficient for searches and sei-
zures. The fourth amendment itself requires a no
more demanding test before a search and seizure
may be made.1 2 5
Lastly, the judicial authorization provision is
constitutional. It merely takes the decision of when
an unannounced entry may be made out of the
hands of the police, leaving it with an impartial
judge. The judge too must have probable cause
to meet the requirements of the statute so the
fourth amendment requirements are fulfilled.
The "no-knock" section of the District of Colum-
bia Crime Act provides for unannounced entries
which do not abridge the demand of the fourth
1-338 U.S 160, 175-76.
124357 b.z..301 (1958).
r2 See note 122 sui'ra.
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amendment that all searches and seizures be
reasonable. But since the terms of the statute are
probably the broadest permitted by constitutional
standards, the courts must take care that the Act
is not abused. Its terms must be applied strictly
and carefully, or else the individual's right to
privacy may be made meaningless 2
6
'2 A warning on construing fourth amendment
rights which should be remembered was issued by the
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886):
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Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure. This can only be obviated by adher-
ing to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal construction de-
prives them of half their efficacy, and leads to grad-
ual deprecation of the right, as if it consisted more
in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ment thereon.
Id. at 635; see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
17 n. 8 (1948).
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NO PANACEA: CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION
OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Without any foreshadowing the Supreme Court
announced three opinions in mid-1967 which radi-
cally extended the application of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. In United States v. Wade,'
the Court held that a pretrial, post-indictment
lineup 2 at which the defendant was identified was a
"critical stage" of the criminal proceedings. The
Court ruled that absent an intelligent waiver by
the accused, counsel for the accused must be pres-
ent at the pretrial confrontation.' In Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia,4 decided the same day, the Court attached
the sanction of per se inadmissibility to any identi-
fication evidence procured in violation of Wade. In
the third case, Stovall v. Denno,' the Court held
that the rules announced in Wade and Gilbert would
not be applied retroactively. Nonetheless, the
Court ruled that fourteenth amendment due proc-
1388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2 The term "lineup" has come to mean an identifica-
tion confrontation in which at least one person other
than the suspect participates. The term "showup" is
most commonly associated with a one-to-one or face-
to-face confrontation with the lone suspect.
3 388 U.S. at 237. The subject of waiver of the de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights has been carefully
examined in the lower courts. See Henry v. State, -
Ala. App. , 239 So.2d 318 (1970) (Voluntary waiver
established by signed form); People v. Keim, 8 Cal.
App.3d 776, 87 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1970) (Half-hour wait
for counsel insufficient to constitute waiver); Jaggers v.
People, - Colo. -, 484 P.2d 796 (1971); Redding v.
State, 10 Md. App. 601, 272 A.2d 70 (1971) (no waiver
where defendant's counsel was notified and did not at-
tend); Walker v. State, 454 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim.
1970). See generally Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962). See also United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1970) (Waiver can only follow adequate warn-
ing of rights independent of Miranda warnings); People
v. Tribble, 4 Cal.3d 826, 484 P.2d 589, 94 Cal. Rptr.
613 (1971) (Effective waiver not contingent on warning
of purpose of lineup); Commonwealth v. Guillory,
Mass. _, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970).
In some jurisdictions the practice of using substitute
counsel has been undertaken. See Read, Lawyers at
Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extrav-
agance?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 339, 368-75 (1969);
Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Pro-
ceedings: A Problem in Effective Implementation of an
Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PrrT. L. Xxv. 65, 83
(1967). Use of substitute counsel was approved in
United States v. Queen, 435 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Summerville v. State, 226 Ga. 854, 178 S.E.2d 162
(1970); State v. Griffin, 205 Kan. 370, 469 P.2d 417
(1970) (Substitute counsel is not required to further
represent defendant).
'388 U.S. 263 (1967).
5 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
ess governs the conduct of pretrial identification
proceedings. 6
The justification given for the three decisions was
the conflict between the enormous weight given
eyewitness identification evidence at trial 7 and the
documented frequency of erroneous identification 8
The Court viewed the danger of suggestion by the
police, by the circumstances, or by the defendant
himself as subtle but great.9 Moreover, there was
felt to be little likelihood that the presence of preju-
dicial suggestion at a pretrial lineup would be
brought to light at trialV9
In view of these considerations, the Supreme
Court sought to prevent potential injury to the
6 Id. at 302.
7Id. at 229. One commentator observes:
Many people are completely nondescript in ap-
pearance. Others have poor eyesight, or dismal
powers of observation. Yet even when the latter
identify the former in a criminal trial, there is a
special impact that sways jurors beyond almost
anything else.
F. GRAHAM, Max Sanr-IN CTED WouND 225 (1970).
See also P. WALL, EtE-WrrmNss IENTIFICATION IN
CaRnAL CAsEs, 1-65 (1965). But see McGowan, Con-
stitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12
Wm. & MAR L. R.v. 235 (1970) (Juries tend to be
unimpressed by identifications occurring solely from
the witness stand).
$See generally E. BoacmAR , CONviCTING = IN-
NOCENT (1961); J. FRA.x & B. FRANx, NoT GuILTY
(1957); F. Fi ruRTErx, Tix CAsE or SACCO AND
VANzETTI (1927); WAIL, supra note 7, at 1-65; G.
Wi.raAms, Tax Paoor or GuiLT (3d ed. 1968); Wil-
liams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, 1963
Cans. L. Rv. 479, 543 (1963).
9388 U.S. at 233-37.
The range of possible prejudicial suggestion is vast.
Ordinarily, suggestion includes accentuation of the
suspect in a lineup because of substantial differences in
age, race, height, dress or physical characteristics among
the participants. Using police officers or jail inmates in
lineups may set the suspect apart because of subtle dif-
ferences in attitude, bearing, or degree of nervousness.
Police can by their conduct, such as turning their eyes
towards the suspect, "tell" the witness who the suspect
is. The mere use of the showup aicomplishes the same
result. It clearly tells the witness that the police suspect
this man. Permitting witnesses to consult one another
during an identification can mutually reinforce unsure
identifications. If the defendant is particularly nervous,
he may draw attention to himself. See 388 U.S. at 230-
35; BoRCacAR, supra note 8; WAIL, supra note 7;
Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 8, at 479-90;
Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures-Wade to
Gilbert to Stovall: Lower Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MIN.
L. Xxv. 779 (1971).10 388 U.S. at 234-35.
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defendant caused by unfair identification pro-
cedures through the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Wade and Gilbert therefore required de-
fense counsel to be present at the pretrial con-
frontation. His presence there was intended to
deter suggestive police conduct, and his personal
observation was intended to enable him to recon-
struct the confrontation and its alleged unfairness
at trial."
Interpreting Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall has
proven to be a difficult task. There has been sub-
stantial judicial confusion in interpreting the cases,
reluctance to apply Wade to all identifications,
12
and direct Congressional counter-legislation.13 This
11 Id. at 236.
12 Some courts held the sixth amendment contention
in little esteem before the Supreme Court decided
Wade. Two years before Wade, Judge Burger (now
Chicf Justice) reacted to the increasing number of sixth
amendment objections with:
Such 'Disneyland' contentions as that absence of
counsel at the police line-up voids a conviction are
becoming commonplace. Some arise from the hard
experience of court appointed lawyers, who, having
served diligently without compensation, later find
themselves subjected to vicious and unwarranted
attack s by their ex-clients for failing to raise some
bizarre point conceived by the 'legal experts' in
prison. Having found that the indigent client's
sense of gratification is readily dulled by incarcera-
tion, some court appointed counsel find it expedient
to protect themselves by raising every point, how-
ever absurd, which indigent appellants suggest.
Williams v. United States, 345 F.2d 733, 736 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion).
Some courts still have reservations:
If there be any such violation in this case, it is the
violation of a right which did not exist at the time
the Constitution was adopted or for more than a
czntury and a half thereafter, during which time
the document was interpreted by those great jus-
tices who were instrumental in promulgating it and
urging its adoption originally as well as by those
learned men who helped frame and interpret the
various amendments thereto.
It has been said that the Constitution of the
United States was framed by men inspired by the
Almighty Creator. If that be true, then the cases
cited by the defendant, if valid, would seem to
make it appear that the framers did not correctly
understand their inspiration. Those cases also make
manifest the fact that some 75 of the greatest jus-
tices of the Supreme Court never did know what
the language of the Constitution meant. It would,
therefore, seem that only God knew the true mean-
ing, and He kept it to Himself for 175 years to re-
veal at long last to certain justices some strange
and theretofore undreamed of meanings of the
Constitution, all to the advantage and great joy of
malefactors and to the utter horror and consterna-
tion of the great bulk of the law-abiding citizenry
of the land.
State v. Spencer, 24 Utah 2d 361, 363-64, 471 P.2d 873,
875 (1970).
1 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 82 Stat. 197.
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused
comment will examine lower court application of
Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall to determine the extent
to which the application of these decisions has fur-
thured the Supreme Court's intentions. This com-
ment will also examine the question of whether
Wade has achieved its objectives and will suggest
alternate means of reaching them.
WADE, GILBERT, AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Lower court interpretation of Wade and Gilbert
has resulted in three types of applications. A few
courts have limited the right to counsel to post-in-
dictment lineups. Most courts, however, have re-
quired counsel at any post-arrest lineup which was
critical for sixth amendment purposes, though some
of them have used this "criticality" test to exempt
broad categories of pretrial police activity from
Wade. Finally, the District of Columbia Circuit
has simply held that Wade applies to any identifi-
cation proceeding in the absence of urgency.
A handful of courts has restricted the applica-
tion of the principle of Wade and Gilbert to their
facts, thereby limiting the right to counsel to line-
ups conducted after indictment. 4 The opinions do
not clearly reflect why these courts felt compelled
to restrict the right to counsel in this manner. Some
reliance seems to have been placed on the opening
language of the Supreme Court in Wade which
posed the question to be considered as involving a
"post-indictment lineup." 1" Though this charac-
commit or participate in the commission of the
crime for which the accused is being tried shall be
admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution in
any trial court ordained and established under
article III of the Constitution of the United States.
18 U.S.C. §3502 (Supp. IV, 1969). The Senate com-
mittee report accompanying the legislation resolves
any doubt that this provision was intended to over-
ride Wade and Gilbert, and the "disastrous rule of evi-
dence" created. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968). No court has yet ruled on this conflict. See,
e.g., United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127, 129 n. 5
(5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888(2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp.
286, 291 n. (D.D.C. 1968). But ef. Poole v. State, -
Miss. -_ -, 216 So.2d 425, 426 (1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 965 (1969).
14 See State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964
(1969); Robinson v. State, - Fla. Supp. -, 237 So.2d
268 (1970); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill.2d 571, 244 N.E.2d
173 (1969); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.
1970). Cf. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664,
173 S.E.2d 792 (1970) (implicit).
The validity of this minority position is currently
under review by the Supreme Court. Kirby v. People,
121 Ill. App.2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970), cert.
granted sub nora. Kirby v. Illinois, 39 U.S.L.W. 3520
(U.S. May 24, 1971) (No. 6401).
15388 U.S. at 219:
The question here is whether courtroom identifica-
tions of an accused at trial are to be excluded from
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terization of the factual circumstances of the case
was carefully preserved throughout Wade,'" there
is language in the opinion and in subsequent opin-
ions which conspicuously fails to preserve that
factual distinction. I7 The Court's inconsistency
makes this interpretation of Wade a poor basis for
decision.
A stronger argument for limiting Wade and Gil-
bert to post-indictment lineups is that this provides
a clear standard for the police. To determine when
a defendant's right to counsel firmly attaches, it is
much easier to point to the securing of an indict-
ment than it is to determine when the accusatory
stage or probable cause for arrest has occurred.
Such an arbitrary, though dear, dividing line can
be justified only by the state's interest in avoiding
unduly handicapping and confusing the police in
their efforts to catch criminals' 3
Most state and federal courts have permitted the
application of Wade and Gilbert beyond their
facts." In a leading case applying Wade, People v.
Fowler,"0 the California Supreme Court interpreted
the rules in Wade and Gilbert to apply to lineups
occurring before indictment. The California court
offered three reasons for this decision which have
persuasively influenced other courts. First, the
evidence because the accused was exhibited to the
witnesses before trial at a post-indictment lineup
conducted for identification purposes without
notice to and in the absence of the accused's ap-
pointed counsel.
See People v. Palmer, 41 1ll.2d at , 244 N.E.2d at 174;
Robinson v. State, __ Fla. Supp. at .,237 So.2d at 270.6 See 388 U.S. at 219, 237. 272.
17 See id. at 227, 251 (,Vhite, J., dissenting), 298;
Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1968)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
"8 See Hayes v. State, 46 Wis.2d 93, 107, 175 N.W.2d
625, 633 (1971) (concurring opinion). See generally 388
U.S. at 255 (White, J., dissenting); LaFave, Street
Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peter
and Beyond, 67 Micr. L. R.v. 40, 119 (1968).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305
(3d Cir. 1970) (Wade applicable to photo identifica-
tions); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1968); United States v. Gilmore, 398 F.2d 679 (7th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610(E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Wilson, 283 F. Supp.
914 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 461
P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); Billinger v. State,
9 Md. App. 628, 267 A.2d 275 (1970); Palmer v. State,
5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969); People v. Hutton,
21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970) (Scrutinize
any pretrial confrontation); Thompson v. State, 85
Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969); State v. Isaacs, 24
Ohio App.2d 115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970); It re Holley,
- R.I. __, 268 A.2d 723 (1970) (extending Wade pre-
indictment and to juveniles); Jones v. State, 47 Wis.2d
642, 178 N.W.2d 42 (1970) (Court interprets its war-
rant stage as correlative to federal indictment and ex-
tends Wade to pre-warrant).
20 1 Cal.2d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363
(1969).
court could not find any reason for strictly limiting
the principles of Wade and Gilbert to their facts.
The court felt that the prejudicial risks and conse-
quences of a lineup were the same whether it oc-
curred before or after indictment.21 Secondly, Wade
required an examination of the circumstances of
every confrontation to determine whether it was a
critical stage of the proceedings. Finally, the court
expressed concern that restricting Wade to post-in-
dictment lineups would permit the police to skirt
constitutional rights by simply conducting all line-
ups before indictment.2
The application of Wade to pre-indictment line-
ups has not been uniform. Some courts have tested
the criticality of each confrontation"s in determin-
ing whether counsel's presence was required. In
Hayes v. State,24 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
Wade applicable to a stationhouse lineup conducted
within three hours after the alleged offense. The
basis for applying Wade was the critical nature of
the confrontation. The court held that circum-
stances surrounding the lineup caused the police to
focus unduly on the accused, thereby creating ex-
ceptional risks of improper suggestion at the con-
frontation.5
Though most courts have interpreted Wade and
Gilbert broadly, practical and policy considerations
have caused some of them to wholly exempt cer-
tain types of identification proceedings. Fre-
quently the issue has been whether exigent circum-
stances justified a concededly improperly sugges-
tive identification practice.6 Further exceptions
have been produced by applying notions of inher-
ent reliability or circumstantial fairness to identify
those identification confrontations which are not
critical for sixth amendment purposes.
One type of confrontation which the lower courts
21Id. at 342, 461 P.2d at 648-49, 82 Cal. Rptr. at
368-69.
22
We cannot reasonably suppose that the high court,
recognizing that the dangers of abuse and misiden-
tification exists in all lineups, would announce a
rule so susceptible of emasculation by avoidance.
Id. at 344, 461 P.2d at 640, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
"3 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ragazzini v. Brierley,
321 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1970); People v. Hutton,
21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); State v.
Royster, 57 N.J. 472, 273 A.2d 574 (1971); State v.
Wilbely, 112 N.J. Super. 216, 270 A.2d 734 (1970);
People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331, 258 N.E.2d 714, 310
N.Y.S.2d 308 (1970); Proctor v. State, 465 S.W.2d 759
(Tex. Crim. 1971); Jones v. State, 47 Wis.2d 642, 178
N.W.2d 42 (1970).
24 46 Wis.2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
"Id. at 97-98, 175 N.W.2d at 627.




have consistently held exempt from the strictures
of Wade and Gilbert is one which occurs shortly
after the commission of the crime.27 In a typical
holding, the District of Columbia Circuit approved
"only those on-the-scene identifications which oc-
cur within minutes of the witnessed crime." 28 In
reaching this decision, the court was concerned with
the delay that would ensue if the Wade right to
counsel were imposed. The court felt that such a
delay would cause unnecessary detention of inno-
cent suspects and the diminished reliability of a
delayed identification.
29
The first of these two concerns is the state's in-
terest in exculpating innocent suspects as soon as
possible in order to free the police to seek the real
offender. If the suspect is not arrested at the scene
of the crime, the chances of ever arresting him are
slim. 0 The courts also agree that the state has an
23 How soon after the crime or how close to the scene
of the crime is the main question courts have had to
resolve. See State v. Meeks, 205 Kan. 261, 469 P.2d 302
(1970); Comment, Right to Counsel at Scene-of-the-
Crime Identifications, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 916 (1969);
Note, United States v. Wade and On the Spot Identifica-
tion, 30 U. PrTT. L. REV. 517 (1969).
If such confrontations as this [fifteen minutes
after the offense at the scene of the crime] violate
our Constitution because they are 'suggestive,'
then much of the evidentiary material which forms
the grist of the fact-finding machinery in our courts
should as well be constitutionally banned for
unreliability.
State v. Boens, 8 Ariz. App. 110, 113, 443 P.2d 925,
928 (1968).
2 Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1969). The District of Columbia Circuit has recently
held that a delay of 60 to 90 minutes after the crime
did not merit the presence of counsel at the identifica-
tion proceedings. See Perry v. U.S., 9 B.N.A. Crim.
L. Reptr. 2220 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1971).
2
9 For an argument that the on-the-scene or field
confrontation is no longer "investigatory" or more
trustworthy than a lineup held later, see Quinn, In the
Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the Eyewitness Iden-
tification Cases, 42 CoLo. L. REv. 135, 144-47 (1970);
Note, supra note 27, at 521, One court maintained that,
The test of criticality is a functional test, based
upon the Wade postulate that possible prejudice to
the accused must be weighed against countervail-
ing policy considerations .... We suggest that
such countervailing policy considerations should
not be limited merely to situations temporally and
physically 'on the scene.'
State v. Jordan, 113 N.J. Super. 563, -, 274 A.2d 605,
608 (1971).30See LaFave, supra note 18, at 117, 119-22.
In the survey, there were 1,905 crimes examined, of
which 482 (25 percent) resulted in arrests or other
clearances. Of these, 70 percent involved arrests,
90 percent of which were made by the patrol force.
More than half of the arrests were made within
eight hours of the crime, many at or near the crime
scene, and almost two-thirds of the arrests were
interest in avoiding the delay of securing counsel
for an on-the-scene identification where such delay
would reduce the reliability of the identifications.
This concern, however, is more difficult to sup-
port. One-to-one confrontations, or showups, have
long been condemned by commentators and by
the Supreme Court in Wade as inherently sugges-
tive.3 The extent to which the showup may en-
danger the reliability of an identification depends
upon the circumstances of the confrontation and
upon the opportunity the witness had to observe
the offender. Where the eyewitness had little op-
portunity or reason to note the features of an
offender,32 he is more open to suggestion. Further-
more, the witness' emotional state or age may
render him unduly receptive to suggestion.33
Nonetheless, the lower courts consistently hold
within the first week after the crime. If a suspect is
neither known to the victinm nor arrested at the scene of
the crime, the chances of ever arresting him are very
slim. Of the 482 cleared cases, 63 percent involve
'named suspects.' In the 1,556 cases without named
suspects, only 181 (or 12 percent) were solved
later by arrest.
PRESIDENT'S CohnoISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADmrNISTRATION OF JUsTIcE, TASK FoRcE RE-
PORT: TaE POLICE 58 (1967) (emphasis added). See
also INsTiTuTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYsIS, A REPORT TO
THE PREsDENT'S ComussIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADmmsNiSTRATiON or JUSTICE, TASK FoRcE RE-
PORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ch. 2, app. B (1967).
31388 U.S. at 234; see, e.g., FRANFURR, supra
note 8, at 31-32; WALL, supra note 7, at 27-40. But see
State v. Spencer, 24 Utah 2d 361, 363, 471 P.2d 873,
875 (1970):
[W]e are unable to see what purpose would be
served by having an attorney present merely to
watch the victim look at the defendant.
22 Perhaps the clearest statement of the "fresh image"
argument supporting the on-the-scene exception to
Wade was articulated by the Indiana Supreme Court:
[RIecognition of a person or face would seem to be
as much the product of a subjective mental image
as of articulable, consciously remembered charac-
teristics. A man may see clearly in his 'mind's eye'
a face or a figure which he is hard put to describe
adequately in words. Though the image of an 'un-
forgettable face' may occasionally linger without
any translation into words, photographic recall is
most often ephemeral. Vivid in the flash of direct
observation, it fades rapidly with time. And the
conscious attempt to separate the ensemble impres-
sion into particular verbalized features, in order to
preserve some recollection, may well distort the
original accurate image so that it is the verbalized
characteristics which are remembered and not the
face or the man.
McPhearson v. State, - Ind. __ _ 253 N.E.2d 226,
229 (1969). See People v. Laurenson, __ Ill. App.
2d -, 268 N.E.2d 183 (1971).
3 See Cotsirilos, Meeting the Prosecution's Case:
Tactics and Strategies of Cross-Examination, 62 J.
CRm. L.C. & P.S. 142, 152 (1971).
[Vol. 62
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE
that identifications secured at on-the-scene show-
ups are inherently more reliable.U
The true reason for the on-the-scene exception
seems to be necessity. This is analogous to the
situation in Stovall where the showup was staged
in the hospital room of the apparently dying vic-
tim of a stabbing. The Supreme Court approved
the showup because of the compelling need to de-
termine immediately whether the suspect was in
fact the offender. 35 To the extent that on-the-scene
identifications can be termed imperative, this ex-
ception to the dictates of Wade and Gilbert seems
justified and sound.
Another frequent exception to the Wade critical-
ity doctrine is identification during the investiga-
tory stage of police activities. In State v. IsaacS3 6 the
court held that this stage continues until the prose-
cutive process "has shifted from the investigatory
stage to the accusatory stage and focuses on the
accused." Certain types of confrontations during
the investigatory stage appear to be free from risks
3 On-the-scene identifications were approved in:
Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir.
1968); People v. Anthony, 7 Cal. App.3d 751, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 767 (1970) (within ten minutes); People v.
Young, 46 Ill.2d 82, 263 N.E.2d 72 (1970); Parker v.
State, - Ind. , 261 N.E.2d 562 (1970) (within fifteen
minutes); McPhearson v. State, _ Ind. -, 253 N.E.2d
226 (1969); State v. Meeks, 265 Kan. 261, 469 P.2d 302
(1970) (within four hours); Commonwealth v. Bumpus,
354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968); State v. Ham-
blin, 448 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1970); State v. DiMaggio,
49 Wis.2d 565, 182 N.W.2d 446 (1971).
On stationhouse identifications, see State v. Smith,
- Iowa .. 182 N.W.2d 409 (1970); State v. Bibbs,
461 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. 1970); Quinn, supra note 29, at
144-47; Comment, supra note 27; Note, supra note 9,
at 784-87.
,- The Court restated the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
with approval:
Here was the only person in the world who could
possibly exonerate Stovall. Her words, and only
her words, 'He is not the man' could have resulted
in freedom for Stovall. The hospital was not far
distant from the courthouse and jail. No one knew
how long the victim might live .... Under these
circumstances, the usual police lineup, ... was
out of the question.
388 U.S. at 302. Compare Commonwealth v. Bumpus,
354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968) with Common-
wealth v. Cooper, 356 Mass. 74, 248 N.E.2d 253 (1969).
Other courts upholding showups and ensuing identifi-
cations include: United States v. Shannon, 424 F.2d
476 (3d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Williams v.
LaVallee, 415 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1969); United States
ex rd. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 983 (1969).
36 24 Ohio App.2d 115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970). See
also Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1968); Wise v. United States, 383 F.2d 206, 209, 209
n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denid, 390 U.S. 964 (1968).
of suggestion. In a recent case,37 the victim of an
armed robbery toured the neighborhood where the
crime bad occurred with police and identified the
defendant from a group of six to eight youths
standing on a corner. Though the victim had given
the police a description of the offender prior to the
identification, it is difficult to perceive how the
circumstances of the confrontation could have
worked prejudicial suggestion where no suspect had
yet been singled out by the police.3 Consequently,
in circumstances such as these, requiring the pres-
ence of counsel seems an unnecessary burden on
police investigation.
A more frequent investigatory identification
proceeding is the practice of "open crimes" con-
frontations. These confrontations generally involve
placing the suspect, who is in police custody under
charges or suspicion of other offenses, in a lineup
to be viewed by witnesses to a number of unsolved
crimes having a common inodus operandi and geo-
graphical proximity. 9 A defendant objected to the
inequities of this practice in United States v. Allen, 0
but the District of Columbia Circuit balanced the
interests at stake and held that "the inherent sug-
gestibility of a lineup is outweighed in this case by
the reasonable suspicion that the appellant may
indeed be responsible for the open crimes."'4
Despite the fact that the police had not focused on
the suspect for a specific offense, the risks of mis-
identification and suggestiveness are as serious as
7 People v. Robinson, 46 Ill.2d 229, 263 N.E.2d 57
(1970).
s But see id. at 232. The court held that the trial
court had improperly excluded questions by defense
counsel put to the robbery victim at the trial hearing.
The excluded questions were in part directed at whether
police were sufficiently informed of the suspect's
description to influence the victim's identification.
,' See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Mentor, 433 S.W.2d 816,
818 (Mo. 1968); Lujan v. State, 428 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.
Crim. 1968). The use of open crimes lineups is appar-
ently widely employed. See generally Read, supra note
3, at 368-69 (discussing open crimes lineups in the
District of Columbia as modified by Adams v. United
States, 399 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968)); Comment, The
Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in thle
Lower Courts, 36 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 830, 838 (1969).
40 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969).41 Id. at 1289. In the District of Columbia, however,
a defendant has the right to have counsel present at
such confrontations, and indeed, the court in Allen
took pains to make suggestions to law enforcement as
to the proper role of counsel at such confrontations. See
also People v. Blumenshine, 42 Ill.2d 508, 250 N.E.2d
152 (1969) (disapproval of certain kinds of open crimes
lineups); Read, supra note 3, at 369 n. 89 (noting the
risks for non-suspects participating in lineups).
1971]
COMMENT
those in the confrontations specifically considered
in Wade and Gilbert. Furthermore, requiring the
presence of counsel at a formally organized lineup
is hardly a substantial obstacle to police investi-
gatory efforts.
Carving a wholesale exception from the applica-
tion of Wade and Gilbert provides a rule of thumb,
but does not address the dangers of suggestion
present in each particular factual context. For in-
stance, the courts have generally upheld identifica-
tions which occur at a chance or accidental encoun-
ter between a suspect and an eyewitness.42 This
exception to Wade seems justified because improper
suggestion is unlikely. Yet a blanket exception for
accidental encounters may, in certain circum-
stances, conceal highly prejudicical suggestion.
Many accidental identifications, though seemingly
spontaneous, are the result of staged encounters by
the police.4"
Many courts have similarly held Wade inap-
plicable to identifications occurring in a courtroom,
observing that the conduct of such proceedings is
solely within the trial court's discretion.44 Yet the
dangers of suggestion and the need to recreate the
confrontation's circumstances at trial are as pres-
ent here as at out-of-court confrontations in the
accusatory stage of proceedings. 45
The District of Columbia Circuit has interpreted
Wade and Gilbert more broadly than any other
court. Building on two earlier decisions,46 the court
held in United States v. Greene47 that counsel was
required at an informal pre-arrest confrontation.
12 See People v. Covington, 47 Ill.2d 198, 265 N.E.2d
112 (1970); Robertson v. State, 464 S.W.2d 15, 19(Mo. 1971) (encounter at police station); State v.
Turner, 81 N.M. 571, 469 P.2d 720 (1970) (no right to
hearing on taint where confrontation inadvertant).
"1The fact that the witness accidentally "bumped
into" the suspect should perhaps itself arouse suspicion.
Random encounters, where the victim identifies the
handcuffed suspect in a police station prior to a formal
lineup, may be the handiwork of the police. This ploy
is known as the "Oklahoma showup" in police jargon.
GR.Am, supra note 7, at 229. See United States ex rel.
Ragazzini v. Brierley, 321 F. Supp. 440, 443 (W.D. Pa.
1970) (Dictum that accidental encounters are not im-
mune from constitutional infirmity); People v. Catlett,
48 Il.2d 56, 268 N.E.2d 378 (1971).
44See, e.g., Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1970).
41 See Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); United States v. Roth, 430 F.2d 1137 (2d
Cir. 1970). In Roth, the court held that Wade applies
to any identification where the witness was asked by
the prosecutor to "walk through" the courtroom during
recess to see if anyone resembled the offender.
46 United States v. Long, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
4 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In Greene, the victims of a robbery asked to see the
suspect "in the flesh" after making an uncertain
photo identification. The police officer in charge,
feeling there was no probable cause for arrest, sim-
ply summoned the suspect and the victims to the
police station. Before the officer arrived, the vic-
tims had positively identified the suspect from a
group of a dozen men standing in a waiting area.
The court found the identification to be defective,
holding that the presence of counsel was essential
for later reconstructing the exact circumstances
of the confrontation."
The identification in Greene was investigatory,
the suspect was not in custody, and the police
could not legally compel the suspect to participate
in a lineup. The District of Columbia Circuit none-
theless held Wade applicable,49 ruling that the
Wade right to counsel was a "threshold question
to that of the fairness of the confrontation weighed
in the due process scale of the Fifth Amendment."
Under this view, enhanced reliability or circum-
stancial fairness does not vitiate the right to
counsel. Wade applies to any identification con-
frontation absent circumstances importing neces-
sity. 50
The District of Columbia Circuit's interpreta-
tion of Wade and Gilbert seems soundest. Any
identification is critical insofar as it initiates
prosecution of the suspect. As long as courts con-
tinue to permit broadly-defined exemptions from
Wade, they perpetuate many of the dangers of
improper suggestion at identifications and they
prevent the meaningful review of identifications
at trial.
STOVALL v. DENNO AND DuE PROCESS
Together with right to counsel in Wade and
Gilbert, the Supreme Court announced a standard
of due process in Stovall v. Dennol' to which all
pretrial identification confrontations must adhere.
In Stovall, the Supreme Court held that the "total-
4
8 Id. at 196.
49 Id. But see Butler v. Robbins, 434 F.2d 1009 (Ist
Cir. 1970) ("In the flesh" request minimizes danger of
suggestion).
For a potential Congressional solution to the prob-
lem presented in Greene, see bill introduced by Senator
Hruska, S. 3563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). For a
discussion of Greene by one of the judges who decided
the case, see McGowan, supra note 7, at 242-44. See
generally Carrington, Speaking for the Police, 61 J.
CRim. L.C. & P.S. 244, 265-74 (1970) (Colorado rule
compelling suspects to submit to fingerprinting).50See United States v. Green, 436 F.2d 290, 291
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
r, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See Note, Due Process Con-




ity of the circumstances" surrounding the con-
frontation must be considered in determining
whether "circumstances conducive to irreparable
mistaken identity" are present. Beyond this terse
elaboration of due process, the lower courts have
been afforded little guidance by the Supreme
Court5' as to what constitutes an impermissibly
suggestive and therefore unconstitutional identifi-
cation proceeding.
In Foster v. United States," the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction where the police had hinted
"this is the man" so often to the victim that the
defendant had been denied due process. The Court
observed that, while the reliability of an identifi-
cation is ordinarily a jury question,54 suggestion
which undermines the reliability of an identifica-
tion can, "past a line," infringe constitutional
protections.
Lower court decisions' s are inconsistent in their
determination of which identification confronta-
tions go "past a line" of constitutionally permissi-
ble conduct. In People v. Laurenson" an Illinois
court found that the circumstances of a robbery
witness' identification of the defendant at a pre-
liminary hearing were so suggestive, in light of the
totality of the surrounding circumstances, that the
defendant was deprived of a fair trial and due
process of law. The key circumstance which made
the identification suspect was the eyewitness'
wholly inadequate opportunity to observe the
offender when the crime was committed.Y1 The
absence of sufficient original observation together
52See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (Identification by
photographs held not violative of Stovall).
394 U.S. 440 (1969).54 Id. at 442 n. 2.
51 Confrontation violated due process: Foster v.
California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); United States v.
DeBose, 433 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970) (height differ-
ence at lineup, picture of suspect in newspaper before
lineup); United States v. Gilmore, 398 F.2d 679 (7th
Cir. 1968) (Only witness wore bifocals, over 70, first
unsure of identification, and would not testify without
corroboration); Roper v. Beto, 318 F. Supp. 662 (E.D.
Tex. 1970) (voice identification); People v. Werner, 26
Micb. App. 109, 182 N.W.2d 18 (1970) (hospital
confrontation); People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331,
258 N.E.2d 714, 310 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1970) (defendant's
counsel denied access); Proctor v. State, 465 S.W.2d
759 (Tex. Crim. 1971) (cellblock showup); Jones v.
State, 47 Wis.2d 642, 178 N.W.2d 42 (1970) (Victims
viewed suspect together).
Confrontation did not violate due process: Sears v.
Sigler, 298 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Neb. 1969); Baker v.
State, 3 Md. App. 251, 238 A.2d 561 (1968); Sertuche
v. State, 453 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. 1970).
6 _._ll. App.2d , 268 N.E.2d 183 (1971).
67 Id. at , 268 N.E.2d at 185.
with the conspicuous failure by the police to ar-
range a confrontation during the period of custody
prior to the preliminary hearing was held to be
ample justification for finding a due process viola-
tion."3
The Laurenson court also suggested that the
length of time between the alleged crime and the
corporeal identification may be a critical index of
reliability. 59 Thus, suggested the court, the failure
to hold a lineup within a certain time after a sus-
pect has been apprehended may indicate a degree
"of uncertainty on the part of the police." 11 Yet
the District of Columbia Circuit"' has recently up-
held a conviction where the first corporeal identi-
fication of the defendant occurred at trial, some
eleven months after the crime.
A similar problem exists where the witness to the
crime views or otherwise senses only a portion of
the offender's physiognomy. Such was the situation
in a case where the victim was blindfolded, raped,
and afterwards engaged in conversation by her
assailant. 62 Faced with these circumstances, a dis-
trict court granted the defendant's writ of habeas
corpus, holding that ' the victim's identification of
the defendant's voice as the voice of her assailant,
in circumstances which resembled a showup, was
constitutionally impermissible." The court recog-
nized that the practice of a one-to-one showup pro-
ceeding was inherently dangerous, and that where
this practice was limited to the assailant's voice,
the confrontation became unnecessarily conducive
to irreparable mistaken identity."
If a change in time may affect a witness' ability
to identify the offender, it should likewise hold
true that any substantial difference in appearance
would undermine the reliability of an identification.
But in People v. Cesarz65 the Illinois Supreme Court
discounted just such a change between a suspect's
18 Id. at -' 268 N.E.2d at 185-86.
Id. at __ 268 N.E.2d at 186. But see United States
v. Toney, 440 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1971); Thurman v.
State, - Ind. _ __, 262 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1970)(Dictum that absence of any pretrial confrontation
would not render subsequent in-court identification
violation of due process); Moye v. State, 122 Ga. App.
14, 176 S.E.2d 180 (1970) (Pretrial lineup not pre-
requisite to in-court identification).
60 Cf. United States v. Gaines, 436 F.2d 150, 153(D.C. Cir. 1970) (suggesting to police that lineup be
held as soon as practicable after arrest).
61 United States v. McNair, 433 F.2d 1132 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). See WAuI, supra note 7, at 127.
6Roper v. Beto, 318 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
"Id. at 667. But cf. Hurst v. State, - Miss.-, 240
So.2d 273 (1970).
64318 F. Supp. at 665-66. This was a pre-Wade
confrontation.65 44 Ill.2d 180, 255 N.E.2d 1 (1969).
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appearance at the scene of the crime and the
identification proceeding, holding that the fact
that the defendant was first chosen from a very
large group of individuals certified an unimpeach-
ably fair confrontation."
An examination of the lower courts' application
of Stovall reveals disagreement as to what consti-
tutes circumstances conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identity. This is due to the fact that courts
consider different things in determining the due
process issue 67 because they fail to consider in each
case all the possible dangers of eyewitness identifi-
cation which the Supreme Court examined in
Wade, Gilbert and Stovall.6
WADE-GILBERT EXCLUSIONARY RuLEs
The lower court interpretations of Wade and
Gilbert have done more than improperly deny ac-
cess to counsel and due process-they have also
misapplied the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rules.
The exclusionary rules formulated by the Supreme
Court for Wade and Stovall violations 9 require a
two-step analysis. The court must fist determine
whether an identification violated the defendant's
right to counsel or due process of law.70 It must
then exclude any evidence of that identification
where such a violation has occurred. In addition,
Gilbert undermines the reliability of any pre-trial
or in-court identification secured subsequent to
61Id. at 184, 255 N.E.2d at 4. The accused was
wearing swimming trunks and sun glasses during the
pool-side confrontation at a motel.
61 Compare State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d
964 (1969); People v. Cesarz, 44 Ill.2d 180, 255 N.E.2d
1 (1969); People v. Williams, - Ill. App.2d -, 268
N.E.2d 730 (1971); Kirby v. People 121 Ill. App.2d
323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970), cert. granted sub noma.
Kirby v. Illinois, 39 U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S. May 24,
1971) (No. 6401); State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super.
128, 257 A.2d 377 (1969) with United States v. Ganter,
436 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1970); People v. Tribble, -
Cal.3d __, 484 P.2d 589, 94 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1971);
Proctor v. State, 465 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. 1971).
68 388 U.S. at 233-36, 241.
19See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1247, 1254(D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting); Comment,
Protection of Accused at Police Lineups, 6 CoL. J.L. &
S.P. 345, 351-52 (1970). But see United States v.
McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808, 810 (3d Cir. 1969) (Inde-
pendent origin doctrine not applicable to confronta-
tions violating due process).
70 388 U.S. at 273. In State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App.2d
115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970), the court held that a
defendant may properly object to the illegality of
identification evidence not directly identifying the
defendant, which is admitted at his trial. See also Peo-
ple v. Bisogni, 4 Cal.3d 582, 483 P.2d 780, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 164 (1971). But see Burton v. State, 442 S.W.2d
354 (Tex. Crim. 1969).
the excluded identification. To be admissible at
trial, a subsequent identification must be shown
not to be tainted by the illegally obtained identifi-
cation through clear and convincing evidence that
it was based on the witness' observation of the
offender prior to the illegal proceeding.71 Finally,
the Supreme Court required that if evidence of the
illegal confrontation or evidence of any subse-
quent identification which lacked an "independ-
ent source" was introduced, then the conviction
must be reversed, unless the introduction of such
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 2
Despite the apprehensions of courts and com-
mentators, the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rules
have not proven a difficult obstacle for the prose-
cution to overcome. Some courts have skipped the
two-step analysis entirely by failing to test the
constitutionality of an identification where the
court was confident that the subsequent in-court
identification had an independent sourceYn With-
out the two-step analysis, however, it cannot be
decided on appeal whether the introduction of
illegal identification evidence was harmless error.
Thus, to the extent that the courts fail to find that
the identification was not violative of the right to
counsel, they preclude the operation of the exclu-
sionary rule and defeat the Supreme Court's rea-
sons74 for creating it.
7 388 U.S. at 272.
72 The Court cited Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967), on the standard for harmless error. But see
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (Four
dissenting justices felt that Chapman was overruled by
the majority). For an analysis of the doctrine of harm-
less error, see Comment, A Multi-Ride Approach to
Harmless Constitutional Error, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
202, 212 (1970).
Admission of illegal identification evidence not
harmless error: Commonwealth v. Guillory, - Mass.
-, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); People v. Werner, 26 Mich.
App. 109, 182 N.W.2d 13 (1970).
Harmless error: United States v. Horton, 440 F.2d
253 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. DeBose, 433
F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970); Fitts v. United States, 406
F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1969); People v. Covington, 47
Ill. 2d 198, 265 N.E.2d 112 (1970); Redding v. State,
10 Md. App. 601, 272 A.2d 70 (1971); People v. Gon-
zales, 27 N.Y.2d 53, 261 N.E.2d 605, 313 N.Y.S.2d
673 (1970).
7See Butler v. Robins, 434 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir.
1970); Haskins v. United States, 433 F.2d 836 (10th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Parker 432 F.2d 1251(9th Cir. 1970); People v. Covington, 47 Ill.2d 198, 265
N.E.2d 112 (1970); State v. Hughes, 5 N.C. App. 639,
169 S.E.2d 1 (1969).74 The Supreme Court intended the exclusionary
rules to serve as a deterrent to unlawful police conduct
at pretrial identification proceedings. The failre to
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Courts have also vitiated the effect of the ex-
clusionary rules through leniency in the require-
ment that an in-court identification be based on
observation other than at the illegal confrontation.
This leniency is often evidenced by a court's failure
to examine closely the circumstances of the witness'
original encounter with the offender 7 5 Generally,
the most compelling factor in the court's eyes is the
witness' opportunity to observe the offender at the
scene of the crime 6 While the length of time of the
opportunity alone will not guarantee that a strong
and enduring impression of the offender remains
in a witness' mind, some courts, in finding an in-
dependent source, have readily accepted the wit-
ness' word that he was positive of the identifica-
tion. 5 Other courts, however, have explicitly
broadened the scope of inquiry to include circum-
stances after the crime which reveal the adequacy
of the original opportunity to observe7 9 Pertinent
factors are whether the defendant was identified
by more than one eyewitness, whether he failed
to be identified, how positive these identifications
were, and whether there was a serious discrepancy
determine the legality of the proceeding would appear
to defeat that purpose. In the absence of such a determi-
nation, the admission of the pretrial confrontation evi-
dence would not affect the validity of the trial. But even
if that evidence were not introduced at trial, the
Supreme Court recognized that:
The lineup is most often used, as in the present
case, to crystallize the witnesses' identification of
the defendant for future reference.... The State
may then rest upon the witnesses' unequivocal
courtroom identification, and not mention the pre-
trial identification as part of the State's case at
trial.
388 U.S. at 240.
Thus the exclusionary rule against tainting of subse-
quent identification evidence is another facet of the
Court's attempt to deter unlawful police conduct. But
the issue of tainting will not be given full consideration,
if any, if the first step, determining the legality of the
pretrial confrontation, is brushed over. See United
States v. Parker, 432 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1970).
7
5See, e.g., Robinson v. State, - Fla. Supp. __, 237
So.2d 268 (1970) (Rape victim and husband observed
defendant for half hour); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill.2d
571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969); State v. McClain, - Kan.
. _, 479 P.2d 907, 909 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Balukonis, __ Mass. -, 260 N.E.2d 167 (1970) (op-
portunity prior to and during robbery to observe
defendant); Duncan v. State, 454 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.
Crim. 1970).
7 See, e.g., State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453
P.2d 951 (1969) (three minutes observation and
distinctive features).
77 See WALL, supra note 7, at 16-17.78 But see BORCMARD, supra note 8, at 50; WALL,
supra note 7, at 16.
79 See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 356 Mass. 74, 248
N.E.2d 253 (1969); State v. Mershon, - Ore. App. -,
459 P.2d 551 (1969); VAr., supra note 7, at 90-130.
between the police description of the offender and
the suspect's appearance. The Supreme Court im-
plicitly approved the latter approach in Wade by
asserting that no single factor, including the eye-
witness' opportunity to observe the offender,
should be deemed controlling. 0
TiiE OPERATION AND SUCCESS OF WADE
Though the Supreme Court in Wade carefully
outlined its reasons for fashioning a new legal
standard for identification practice, it did not
offer any practical guidance to the day-to-day
keepers of the Wade and Stovall rules: judges at
trial, lawyers at Wade-Stovall hearings, and lawyers
at lineups. In many respects, however, the uncer-
tainty of these roles has provided the strongest
challenge to the efficacy of the right to counsel
and due process remedies created by those cases.
Wade and Stovall hearings are occasionally not
held at trial. The failure to fully consider the
validity of pretrial identifications and possible
tainting of subsequent identifications at the trial
level effectively precludes meaningful appellate
review. Yet some appellate courts, instead of re-
manding the case for a hearing, proceed to resolve
the issues themselves on the basis of an inadequate
trial record.P Concerned with the dangers of this
practice and the inefficiency of remanding the case
to the trial court for a hearing, other courts have
suggested that the trial judge should take the in-
itiative and inquire into the need for a Wade or
Stovall hearing where circumstances indicate that
identification testimony will be important.P
A related problem is the latitude to be given
defense counsel in questioning the circumstances
surrounding a pretrial confrontation at a Wade or
Stovall hearing. Many jurisdictions have asserted
80 388 U.S. at 241.81 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 432 F.2d 1251
(9th Cir. 1970).
87I f the essential facts concerning the pretrial
confrontation are not preserved in the trial record, the
appellate court is dearly not in a position to review its
constitutionality, the first step of the analysis. The
District of Columbia Circuit responded to this problem
by suggesting that the district judges take the initiative
and ask defense counsel whether a Wade or Stovall
hearing is needed in cases where identification evidence
figures prominently. Solomon v. United States, 408
F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also United States v.
Wright, 433 F.2d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 1970), approving
the Solomon suggestions:
Such a procedure would promote the orderly ad-
ministration of justice so often disrupted by the
questions belatedly raised for the first time on




a clear policy against using such a hearing for dis-
covery purposes,u and have therefore been quick
to limit the scope of defense counsel's inquiry.
Moreover, some courts deny the defendant a right
to a hearing altogether if his counsel attended the
pretrial identification proceeding.8 4
The Supreme Court did not suggest in Wade
what the proper role of counsel should be at line-
ups or other identification proceedings. Nor have
many lower courts attempted to provide that
guidance. 5 Several commentators have even ar-
gued the futility of counsel's presence at lineups,
regardless of the degree of his participation."5 These
arguments point out that counsel is not schooled
in the detection of improper suggestion, that his
deterrence value is exaggerated, and that recon-
struction of the lineup at trial may require that he
testify on his client's behalf. Furthermore, the
principles of Wade could be emasculated by defense
counsel's calculated refusal to attend lineups.u
This refusal may stem from counsel's belief that
by attending the lineup he will increase the credi-
bility of the identification evidence at trial and
thereby work against the interests of his client.as
13 Compare Cefalo v. Fitzpatrick, 434 F.2d 187 (1st
Cir. 1970) with United States ex rel. Brierly, 321 F.
Supp. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1970); People v. Robinson, 46
Ill. 2d 209, 264 N.E.2d 484 (1970) (reversing where
trial judge had improperly excluded questions at
Stovall hearing).
84 See State v. Bishop, - Minn. -, 183 N.W.2d 536(1971).
86 Some courts and some police departments have
attempted to permit a lawyer at a lineup some latitude
of participation. See United States v. Allen, 408 F.
Supp. 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (suggestions for police to
provide counsel with certain information). See also
Thompson v. State, 438 P.2d 287, 289 (Okla. Crim.
1968); Comment, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J.
390, 398 (1967); Comment, supra note 69, at 355-60.
" See, e.g., Read, supra note 3, at 375-77.
87 This was expressed to this writer in an interview
with Mr. Thomas Reynolds, an assistant public de-
fender in Cook County, Illinois. Interview of Feb. 2,
1971. It was his experience that several private trial
attorneys have avoided attending lineups in which
their clients participated after being notified well in
advance by police. They apparently contend that
there is little or nothing they are permitted to do to
stop prejudicial conduct, that by the time the police
are ready to summon an attorney to view a lineup,
there is small likelihood of intentional or careless police
suggestion (see GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 234), and
that in any event, counsel's presence at the lineup
effectively transforms him into an adjunct to the in-
formation-gathering and evidence-generating role of
the prosecution.
8 This point relates to the adversary role of counsel.
The entire burden of prosecution ought to be borne
by the government, and counsel for the defense should
not have to aid the prosecution in securing more credi-
ble and compelling identification evidence. This is not
an idle fear. Judge McGowan, of the District of Colum-
Conversely, the prosecution appears to have
been advantaged by Wade. If counsel attends the
lineup, the prosecution can use this fact to empha-
size the identification's reliability before a jury.
If counsel does not attend the lineup, substitute
counsel may be provided,89 insuring the credibility
of the evidence. Finally, if the lineup is held in
violation of defendant's right to counsel, the prose-
cution may have little difficulty obtaining the ad-
mission of a subsequent in-court identification."
This discussion does not exhaust the very prac-
tical difficulties which remain unattended in the
wake of Wade, Gilbert and Stovall. At present, the
actual mechanics of investigating and attacking
the fairness or reliability of pretrial identification
proceedings remains unsettled, and the practical
effectiveness of Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall in achiev-
ing the Supreme Court's objectives is doubtful.
VIDEO-TAPE RECORDING: A PROPOSAL
A possible solution to many of the problems of
identification techniques is the replacement of live
corporeal identification with videotape reproduc-
tion. The idea was suggested thirty-five years ago
by Dean Wigmore regarding the use of sound
films." This idea has acquired practicability with
the advent of the videotaping process, 92 and pre-
sents a viable alternative to the cumbersome
practice of corporeal identifications. It offers the
bia Circuit, believes that the phenomenon of increased
credibility when counsel attends the lineup, as it effectsjuries, may have caused the conviction ratio to increase.
McGowan, supra note 7, at 241. See also Comment,
Right to Counsel During Pretrial Identification Pro-
ceedings-An Examination, 47 NEB. L. REv. 740, 753-
54 (1968), discussing the relationship between Wade
and Canon 31 of the A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS.
89 See note 3 supra.
10 See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
9J . WnmnoRE, THE SCIENcE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 541
(3d ed. 1937). Wigmore's approach considered the use
of sound films as an alternative to live confrontations.
Re suggested using at least 100 films prepared of men
from various occupations, races, heights, etc. These
men, as well as the suspect, would be photographed in
a series of standardized movements, such as with and
without hat and coat. A number of these films would
be shown in succession to the witness, and his re-
sponse, if any, would be indicated through the use
of electric buttons. Wigmore also suggested that the
degree of certainty or hesitancy of the identification
might be indicated by the number of presses. Id. at
540-41.92The significant advantages of videotaping include:
capturing a person's voice and motions at a feasible
cost, instant replay, no development costs, ability to
monitor the recording and quality, easy indexing for
retrieval, ease in transmission to remote areas. Hicks,
Video Recording in Police Identification, 59 J. CRmI.
L.C. & P.S. 295 (1968).
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possibility of substantially reducing the risks of
prejudicial suggestion which Wade condemned.
The Supreme Court itself invited the use of
modern technology in identification practice. The
Court suggested that anything which would:
eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional sug-
gestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments
to meaningful confrontation at trial may also
remove the basis for regarding the stage as 'criti-
Cal. 93
The Court cited Wigmore's sound film proposal
and suggested that "a more systematic and scien-
tific" 94 process applied to lineups might remove
them from the "critical" category of pretrial pro-
ceedings for sixth amendement purposes. 95 Recent
proposals for legislation governing lineup practice,
as well as present police departmental regulations,98
388 U.S. at 239.94 Id. at 239 n. 30.
95
Of course, the more systematic and scientific a
process or proceeding, including one for purposes
of identification, the less the impediment to recon-
struction of the conditions bearing upon the relia-
bility of that process or proceeding at trial.
Id.
But see Read, supra note 3, at 353-54, questioning
whether the Court's statements regarding legislative
or other safeguards which would "remove the basis for
regarding the [lineup] stage as critical" were in fact
subscribed to by a majority of the Court.
96See Comment, supra note 69, at 363. The regula-
tions of the Detroit Police Department include the
following cautioning language:
The purpose of a lawyer's presence is not to inter-
fere with the conduct of the lineup but to observe
the procedure used by law enforcement officers.
... UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY A
LAWYER INTERFERE WITH THE CON-
DUCT OF THE LINEUP. Nor may a lawyer
properly advise his client to refuse participation.
Similarly, a lawyer may not properly advise the
accused to refuse a voice test, a handwriting sam-
ple, to wear certain clothing, to assume a stance,
to walk, to gesture, or to co-operate in other simi-
lar physical demonstrations.... If any lawyer
should so advise his client, the Prosecuting Attorney's
Office should be notifed so that appropriate action
may be considered.
Id. at 365-66. The Detroit Police Department had
conducted the largest number of lineups since Wade
among the departments responding to the survey. But
see, e.g., People v. Williams, 3 Cal.2d 853, 478 P.2d 942,
92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971), where the court held that
counsel may observe the identification where it occurs
outside the viewing room shortly after the lineup.
This writer viewed an open crimes lineup conducted
by the Chicago Police Department in February, 1971.
The only administrative guide to proper lineup proce-
dure for the Chicago police at that time appeared to
consist of a General Order dated August, 1968, and a
Departmental Notice dated August, 1969. The General
Order outlined requirements of composition and con-
duct of a formal lineup. It appeared that this order
do not purport to eliminate the need for the pres-
ence of counsel. 97 They do, however, substantially
increase the difficulties in arranging lineups"s and
subject police to perhaps too inflexible a code of
procedure. 99 Video-tape recording is a far more
flexible means of ensuring fair identifications, and
could well be the more systematic and scientific
process the Supreme Court invites 0
Videotaping is mechanically simple and requires
no expertise or special training for its operation.10'
While a definitive technique for the use of video-
taping in identification work is beyond the scope
of this comment,1 2 some general suggestions can
be outlined. The actual pretrial confrontation will
consist of having the eyewitness view a series of
videotaped "bits," each bit consisting of a se-
quence of actions, profiles, and spoken words by a
single lineup participant. One of the bits, the se-
and the notice were wholly unknown to the officer
conducting the lineup. The lineup did not appear to be
unfairly conducted nor did an identification occur. But
it was conducted somewhat informally, and it was
clear that where the procedure employed was the most
detached and fair, it was the result of common sense or
coincidence, not the observance of administrative rules.
For an example of an identification conducted "on
the sly," wholly avoiding Wade, see GRAHAm, supra
note 7, at 241-42.
9 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 69, at 368-73;
Comment, supra note 3, at 388-407.99See Comment, supra note 69, at 370-71; Note,
supra note 9, at 803-12.99 The salient characteristic of identifications is their
factual diversity. The keynote to dealing fairly with
the various possible kinds of confrontations would be
flexibility. It would follow then that a legislative code
of police conduct would provide the opposite of what
is needed. One authority has argued:
The more the police are hedged in by telling them
exactly how they must conduct their work, the
more they are likely to feel restricted in the exer-
cise of their duties, and the greater the risk that,
in their frustrations, they may depart from that
very high degree of fairness which can and must be
expected of them. Their chief difficulty, often per-
haps the only one in their eyes, is to collect suffi-
cient evidence to bring to trial a man whom they
have every cause to believe responsible for the
offense in question. This is a practical job, which
the law should, if anything, facilitate, not hamper
with stringent rules laid down in advance.
Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 8, at 547.
100 Cf. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 347, 461 P.2d
643, 652-53, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363,372-73 (1969), where the
court suggested that "scientific and systematic method"
means something like Wigmore's idea, not detailed
police regulations.
10, This information, as well as the bulk of informa-
tion herein about videotaping, was supplied to the
author by Mr. Donald Altergott, field manager for
Apeco Video Systems, division of American Photocopy
Equipment Co., Evanston, Illinois.
102 Wigmore's suggestions would seem to be largely
applicable to videotaping as well as to film. See gen-
erally Hicks, supra note 92.
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quence of which would be identical to the others,
would involve the suspect. The identification, if
any, would take place during such a viewing 3
A library of available bits, all with identical se-
quences, could be established by routinely video-
taping persons at booking when fingerprints and
other information are ordinarily taken. This
method is already being employed by at least one
major police department.1' The library of bits
would then be catalogued according to the type of
features and characteristics of each "bit-partici-
pant." When a videotape confrontation is called
for, several bits could quickly be selected on the
basis of the bit-participant's resemblance to the
suspect. All of this could be done at a quite modest
cost 0 5
Videotaping for identification purposes offers
significant practical advantages over present
corporeal identifications. It would eliminate the
present difficulty of procuring on short notice a
group of lineup participants similar in age, height,
race, and other characteristics to the suspect. The
risk of an unfairly composed lineup would be mini-
mized as far as possible.0 6 Furthermore, videotape
lineups could be arranged and presented to the
witness of a crime as soon as the suspect himself
could be taped0 This would tend to promote the
10 People v. Williams, 3 Cal.3d 853, 478 P.2d 942,
92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971).
104 Miami, Florida.
101 A basic videotaping unit can be purchased retail
for under $2,000. A unit more appropriate for the
needs of identification work would include two re-
corders, a monitor, and camera with zoom lens. A
black and white system like this could be acquired for
under $3,000, less than the price of one squad car.
Hicks, supra note 92, at 297. Hicks reports that at $60
per tape, his initial cost per subject recorded (one bit)
was 800. One-half inch, one hour tapes are presently
available for $40. Furthermore, "Initial tape costs
cannot be considered fully realistic since the possi-
bility of reusing the tape would lower operational cost
repeatedly." Id. at 296.
The addition of color or other sophistication in
equipment would increase the initial cost substantially.
The rather sophisticated system initially acquired by
the Miami Police Department cost about $12,500. Id.
100 Police should not be used as lineup participants
because in cases of importance, they may be tempted
to influence the witness into identifying the suspect by
casting their eyes slightly towards the suspect. Where
the suspect is ill at ease, he contrasts sharply with the
calmer police officers. If the witness is asked to view a
lineup several times, the faces of the officers may be-
come familiar to him. WALL, supra note 7, at 58-59.
107 This advantage apparently persuaded the Miami
Police Department to use videotape recording. They
found it disturbing that in many cases "the subject
arrested for a crime had been released on bond before
the victim was available for a lineup viewing." Hicks,
supra note 92, at 295. Thus, the controversial practice
use of lineup identifications in the ordinary case,
rather than the inherently more prejudicial one-
to-one showups. Videotaping would also preserve
the confrontation itself for reproduction at trial, a
primary objective of Wade. 5s This could be accom-
plished by merely showing the bits used at the
identification in court. The need for counsel at
videotape confrontations would therefore be
diminished. An additional safeguard could be
furnished by videotaping the confrontation be-
tween the eyewitness and the videotape bits.0 9 In
this manner, not only the composition of the lineup
would be preserved for trial, but also police con-
duct during the confrontation and the actual occur-
rence of the witness's identification of the video-
taped suspect.0
Videotape identification practice clearly pro-
vides a system more amenable to tight supervision
than presently employed practices. In addition,
because of its unique advantages, it provides the
possibility of safeguarding identification confron-
tations from the kinds of prejudicial dangers to
which Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall were addressed.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Wade pro-
nounced pretrial identification proceedings critical
in determining the outcome of a defendant's crimi-
of requiring arrested persons out on bail to submit
themselves for lineups would no longer be necessary.
See United States v. Scarpellino, 431 F.2d 475 (8th
Cir. 1970); McGowan, supra note 7, at 245-47; Quinn,
supra note 29, at 154; Read, supra note 3, at 368-69.
Compare United States v. Williams, 421 F.2d 1166(D.C. Cir. 1970) with Adams v. United States, 399
F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
108 388 U.S. at 231-32.
109 But see Cox v. State, - Fla. Supp. , 219 So.2d
762 (1969) (Counsel must be present at videotape
confrontation). Cox may be explained by the court's
reluctance to find sufficient scientific advantages to
satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court. See
People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 363 (1969). It is also significant that the con-
frontation in Cox was not itself recorded, as suggested
above. Whether this additional safeguard, together
with responsible videotape identification practice,
eliminates the need for the presence of counsel can
only be answered by the Supreme Court.
110 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 478
P.2d 942, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971), where the identifica-
tion took place shortly after the lineup and outside the
viewing room. The California Supreme Court held that
Wade required that the defendant's attorney, who was
present at the lineup, be permitted to be present at the
actual identification which occurred shortly after the
lineup. This would seem to be the better view, and
similarly, the use of video reproduction as suggested
herein would require that an identification, if any,
occur during the recorded encounter. See Quinn, supra
note 29, at 149.
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nal prosecution, concluding that the right to
counsel must attach to these proceedings so long
as they remained critical. Wade and its companion
cases did not create a body of well-articulated
rights for defendants at identification confronta-
tions. Indeed, the application of Wade has been in-
consistent and its policies avoided. Its effectiveness,
where applied by the lower courts, is subject to
continuing doubt. Assurance of fair and reliable
identifications has not been seriously undertaken
by law enforcement agencies, yet this goal is one
which lies primarily, and perhaps exclusively,
within their power. The lingering threat of further
Supreme Court activity,m together with the avail-
ability of technological advances, will hopefully
provide the initiative for law enforcement au-
thorities to attend more seriously to the task of
insuring sound identification practice.
"'Kirby v. People, 121 flIApp.2d 323, 257 NX..2d
589 (1970), cer. granted sub. mor. Kirby v. Illnois, 39
U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S. May 24, 1971) (No. 6401), re-
stricting application of Wade to post-indictment lineups;
1971]
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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
POLITICAL DEFENDANT
In Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971), and
five companion cases,' the Supreme Court invoked
the doctrine of equitable jurisdiction to preclude
federal interference in state criminal prosecutions.
In so ruling, the Court foreclosed, in all but excep-
tional circumstances, federal interruption of state
criminal proceedings which are alleged to be of a
political nature.
In Younger, plaintiff successfully sought an in-
junction in a federal district court restraining the
state's attorney from prosecrtting him under the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act. A three-
judge district court held the Act to be violative
of the first and fourteenth amendments, stating
that both the Act's presence and the state's prose-
cution had an inhibiting effect on plaintiff's right
of free speech.'
On direct appeal, a divided Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the three-judge court on the
ground that the lower court did not have jurisdic-
tion to entertain plaintiff's constitutional challenge.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Black empha-
sized the fact that federal courts have traditionally
been forbidden from invoking their equitable pow-
ers to grant jurisdiction in a case where "the mov-
ing party has an adequate remedy at law and will
not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable
relief." I This tradition is reinforced, according to
justice Black, by the notion of "comity" between
state and federal courts: federal courts should
interfere with state operations only in exceptional
circumstances.4 Furthermore, the Court stated that
the irreparable injury with which plaintiff is
threatened must be "both great and immediate" 5
before a federal court can intervene in a state
criminal prosecution.
The Court held that a showing that a statute
was unconstitutional on its face or had a "chilling
'Boyle v. Landry, 91 S. Ct. 758 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 91 S. Ct. 764 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 91
S. Ct. 674 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 91 S. Ct. 777
(1971); and Dyson v. Stein, 91 S. Ct. 769 (1971).
2Younger v. Harris, 281 F. Supp. 507, 517 (C.D.
Cal. 1968).
'91 S. Ct. at 750.
4Id.
Id. at 751, quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240,
243 (1926).
effect" on first amendment rights would not con-
stitute a threat of sufficient "irreparable injury"
to justify equitable intervention by federal courts.6
To gain federal relief the plaintiff must allege an
infringement of federally protected rights and
further show that this alleged infringement "can-
not be eliminated by his defense against a single
crininal prosecution." 7 The Court specifically lim-
ited its holding in Dombrowski v. Pfisters to the
extraordinary situation in which a plaintiff is being
harassed by state authorities who have no in-
tention of bringing a good faith prosecution against
him.
Beyond the special circumstances of Dombrowski,
the Court noted two possible exceptions to the
doctrine of non-intervention as expressed in
Younger. The Court pointed out that a federal
court may grant equitable jurisdiction where a
challenged statute is "flagrantly and patently vio-
lative of express constitutional prohibitions in
every clause, sentence and paragraph." 9 Thus, in
some circumstances, an allegation that a statute is
unconstitutional on its face may still be sufficient
by itself to justify federal intervention. Further,
the Court intimated that where plaintiff is effec-
tively restrained from engaging in constitutionally
protected conduct because there is substantial
likelihood that he will be prosecuted by the state
for engaging in such conduct, a federal court would
have jurisdiction, to provide plaintiff an alterna-
tive to violating the law.10 The threatened state
prosecution, however, must be more than "specu-
lative and imaginative." 1
In cases following Younger, the lower federal
courts, with one exception,"- have exhibited a
6 91 S. Ct. at 754.
0Id. at 755, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387,
402 (1941).
8 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 91 S. Ct. at 755.
,0 Id. at 749.
11 Id.
12 Gray v. City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D.
Ohio 1971). The court ignored Younger v. Harris and
ruled against plaintiffs on the merits of their constitu-
tional attack. The plaintiffs in Gray were not being
prosecuted by the state, but they challenged the
constitutionality of a statute which could have been
applied against them for their previous violations.
While Younger is not precisely in point, it contained
strong language to the effect that speculative future
state action does not justify the intervention of the
federal courts.
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willingness to follow Younger to the letter 3 Of
those courts which have applied Younger to the
circumstances before them, in only one case has a
federal court interrupted a state criminal proceed-
ing to grant plaintiff relief.' 4
PROBATION AND PA.Ror-. - REVOCATION
In Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970),"r
revocation of a state convict's probationary status
without a hearing was held to be "state action
inconsistent with the due process guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment." 6 In denying the appel-
lant's request for a review of the case the Supreme
Court left undisturbed the Court of Appeals de-
cision.'
The Seventh Circuit panel held that:
The state need not grant probation, but if it
does so, it should not be able to arbitrarily revoke
such probation without giving petitioner a rea-
sonable opportunity to explain away the accusa-
tion that he had violated the conditions upon
which his probation was granted. 8
Judge Kerner's opinion rejected the notion that
due process requirements were determined by
whether probation was considered a privilege or a
right, relying heavily on Goldberg v. Kelly," which
held that welfare recipients were entitled to a hear-
ing before benefits could be terminated. The
threat of the loss of freedom to one subjected to the
conditional liberty of probation was found to:
[O]utweigh the added state burden of providing
limited hearing to allow petitioner to be con-
13 Livingston v. Garmire, 9 BNA Can. L. Rpmi.
2166 (5th Cir. May 10, 1971); Veen v. Davis, 9 BNA
Can& L. R.pm. 2108 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1971); Sweeten
v. Sneddon, 9 BNA Cns. L. R'ra. 2009 (D. Utah
Mar. 23, 1971); Ascheim v. Quinlan, 9 BNA Cans. L.
RPmr. 2026 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1971); Lewis v. Kugler,
9 BNA Cans. L. Ri'ra. 2008 (D. NJ. Mar. 9, 1971).
14 Sweeten v. Sneddon, 9 BNA lum. L. RPRm. 2009.
The plaintiff, a parolee, was charged with the violation
of the Utah assault statute which carried a jail term
not exceeding six months. The court chose to intervene
on plaintiff's behalf because it considered irreparable
harm could come to plaintiff if he were convicted on
the misdemeanor charge, since his parole would be re-
voked and he would be subject to serve a term of
seventeen years, five months for violation of parole.
The court held that the denial of plaintiff's right to
counsel could not adequately be rectified in the course
of defending his misdemeanor prosecution. Id. at 2010.
15 The case has been noted at 24 VAND. L. R.v. 163(1970).
1 430 F.2d at 103.
17 Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 91 S. Ct. 1522 (1971).
S 430 F.2d at 104.
Is 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
fronted with his probation violation and to be
heard.20
In Morrisey v. Brewer, 9 BNA Crim. L. Reptr.
2083 (8th Cir. Apr. 21, 1971), the Eighth Circuit
specifically rejected the arguments raised in Hahn
v. Burke as applied to parole revocation hearings:
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Mathes
held:
While we recognize the importance which the
individual parolee attaches to being allowed to
remain outside the prison walls while serving
his sentence, we are not constrained to hold
that his interest in obtaining a hearing on revo-
cation of that privilege is sufficient to override
the interest of the state and the prison authori-
ties in effectively managing internal disciplinary
and custodial affairs.2
In Goolsby v. Gagnon, 8 BNA Crim. L. Reptr.
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 9, 1971), however, Hahn v. Burke
has been held to extend the right to a hearing to
parole revocation proceedings. There the court
asked:
What salient differences are there between pro-
bation and parole that would have an impact
upon petitioner's potential "loss" and the govern-
mental "interest" in summary adjudication?2
No important differences were found between
these two categories of conditional liberty, and
parole revocation was held to require a hearing.
In Hester v. Craven, 322 F. Supp. 1256 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), it was held that the California Adult
Authority" could not extend the sentence of a
parolee to a longer term than originally set, upon a
determination of events outside the prison, with-
out giving the parolee the right to confront the
witnesses against him." The court ruled that its
decision did not disturb the Ninth Circuit's posi-
tion that "there is no federally protected right to
a hearing in a mere parole revocation proceed-
ing." 25 The power of the Adult Authority to ex-
"0 430 F.2d at 104.
19 BNA Cans. L. RP. at 2084. It was contended
by the court that requiring parole boards to grant hear-
ings would be adverse to the interests of state prisoners,
since the result of such hearings "would actually be a
decrease in the number of paroles granted due to the
heavy burden placed upon the administrative process
of supervision and investigation." Id.
"8 BNA Cans. L. Rpm. 2403.
23 See, Comment, Revocation of Conditional Liberty-
California and the Federal System, 28 So. CAL. L. Rxv.
158 (1954).
" 322 F. Supp. at 1266.
2Id. at 1259. See, Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505




tend the parolee's sentence was the factor differ-
entiating this case from a "mere parole revocation
proceeding." 26
FEDERAL NARcOTICs LAWS AND THE
EIG=rn AMENDMENT
In United States v. Watson, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), the court of appeals substantially un-
dermined the application of the federal narcotics
lawsP to addicts who were not engaged in buying
and selling drugs for profit. The defendant heroin
addict was convicted of a violation of federal drug
laws on the basis of his possession of thirteen caps
of heroin23 Two prior felony convictions disquali-
fied him from treatment under the Narcotic Ad-
dict Rehabilitation Act.2 9 On appeal, the court of
appeals, sitting en bane, offered strong language to
the effect that under Robinson v. California,'0
federal narcotics law cannot apply to "non-
trafficking" addicts.
The court reiterated the Robinson holding that
to apply penal sanctions to persons for their
mere addiction to drugs was cruel and unusual
punishment, in violation of the eighth amend-
ment." Nonetheless, the court refused to reverse
defendant's conviction on the grounds that the
eighth amendment issue was not dearly raised at
the trial court level.32 The court did find certain
disqualifying provisions of the Narcotic Addict Re-
habilitation Act unconstitutional and remanded
the case for rehearing with respect to the defend-
ant's eligibility for the rehabilitation program."
In two district court cases, United States v.
Ashton, 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970), and
United States v. Lindsey, 324 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.
1971), Watson has been interpreted to clearly
exempt non-trafficking addicts from the proscrip-
tions of federal narcotics laws. In both cases, con-
cern was expressed over the fact that a defendant
addict not subject to criminal liability could not be
made to take part in the rehabilitation program.
Both courts resolved the dilemma on the particular
facts before them. In Ashton, the court dismissed a
narcotics indictment with knowledge that the
defendant was also charged with bail jumping, and,
26 322 F. Supp. at 1265.
2726 U.S.C. §4704(a) (1964) and 21 U.S.C. §174
(1964).
28 439 F.2d at 445.
2318 U.S.C. §§4251 to 4255 (Supp. V. 1965-1969).
3 0370 U.S. 660 (1962).
31439 F.2d at 452.
32 Id. at 454.
3Id. at 457.
if convicted, would be eligible for the federal
rehabilitation program. 4 In Lindsey, the court
circumvented the Watson decision by applying the
narcotics statutes under the doctrine of Powell v.
Texas.5 The court found the defendant did not
manifest an "utter lack of control" and could not
therefore, be considered an addict2 6
INDIGENT IMPRISONMENT
In Tate v. Short, 91 S. Ct. 668 (1971), the Su-
preme Court extended the rule of Williams v.
Illinoisn to hold that imprisonment merely for in-
ability to pay a fine is a denial of fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection. Tate, the indigent, had
accumulated $425 in traffic fines, and was jailed in
lieu of payment of the fine at the statutory rate of
five dollars a day. The Court adopted the view
of four concurring justices in Morris v. Schoonfield
that:
the same constitutional defect condemned in Wil-
liams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing
to make immediate payment of any fine, whether
or not the jail term of the indigent extends be-
yond the maximum term that may be imposed
on a person willing and able to pay a fine.'
Among the state courts which have interpreted
Tate, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971), exam-
ined the alternatives available to the sentencing
court when the defendant was unable to pay the
fine immediately. The defendant was assessed $705
plus $25 costs for several serious traffic offenses.
Unable to pay this in a lump sum, he offered to
pay in installments. The trial court refused the
offer, ordering him to jail at the statutory rate of
five dollars a day.4' After studying several methods
of payment, the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
cluded that the installment system was the most
practical alternative and that the defendant was
therefore entitled to it by right.4'
justice Blackmun suggested in Tate that an al-
ternative to fines, fair to all, would be a "jail
only" policy.42 The Hawaii Supreme Court, in
-q317 F. Supp. at 863.
"5 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
36 324 F. Supp. at 60.
- 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
'8 91 S. Ct. at 669-70.
"1Id. at 671, quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399
U.S. 508, 509 (concurring opinion of White, .).
40 276 A.2d at 139.
41 Id. at 145-47. See Tate v. Short, 91 S. Ct. at 671
n. 5.
42 91 S. Ct. at 672 (concurring opinion).
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State v. Tacketl, - Hawaii -, 483 P.2d 191 (1971),
emphatically rejected such a notion because it
would reduce sentencing flexibility and would work
an inverse discrimination against "the employed
man with funds." 4
EyEWIiTNESS IDENTIFICATION
In United States v. Wade," the Supreme Court
held that a post-indictment lineup was a critical
stage of pretrial proceedings, invoking the sixth
amendment right to counsel to assure the defend-
ant a fair trial. Some state courts have restricted
the Wade right to counsel to lineups after indict-
ment.4 5 These courts have observed that Wade
and a companion case" involved post-indictment
lineups, and have relied on language in both opin-
ions which stressed this fact.7
Most courts, however, have extended the right
to counsel to pre-indictment indentification pro-
ceedings! 8 In State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d
43 483 P.2d at 192.
44 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
46 See State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964
(1969); Robinson v. State, - Fla. Supp. , 237 So.2d
268 (1970); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill.2d 571, 244 N.E.2d
173 (1969); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.
1970). The Supreme Court will review the minority
position, which restricts the right to counsel to post-
indictment lineups, this term. Kirby v. People, 121
Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970), cert. granted
sub. hanm. Kirby v. Illinois, 39 U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S.
May 24, 1971) (No. 6401).
4" Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
V 388 U.S. at 219, 237, 272.
48See, e.g., United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305
(3d Cir. 1970); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935(5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gilmore, 398 F.2d 679
115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970), the court differenti-
ated the investigatory from the accusatory stage
of the prosecution process as marking the point
when the right to counsel attaches. Some courts
have adopted a test of "criticality" to determine
which confrontations require the presence of
counsel. 49 In State v. Wilbely, 112 N.J. Super. 216,
270 A.2d 734 (1970), the court held Wade applica-
ble to a pre-indictment confrontation where the
police knew that the arrested suspect was repre-
sented by counsel.
The federal courts have tended to apply Wade
broadly. In United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193
(D.C. Cir. 1970), the police, lacking probable
cause for arrest, informally arranged a gathering
including the suspect and victims of the crime at
the police station. The District of Columbia
Circuit held that the suspect's identification at this
confrontation violated Wade. The court recog-
nized the problem of compelling a suspect not
under arrest to participate in a lineup, but none-
theless felt that Wade compelled the presence of
counsel at informal, pre-arrest confrontations.5 0
(7th Cir. 1968); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461
P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); Billinger v. State,
9 Md. App. 628, 267 A.2d 275 (1970); Thompson v.
State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969); In re Holley,
- R.I. -. 268 A.2d 723 (1970).
49 People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d
860 (1970); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis.2d 93, 175 N.W.2d
625 (1970).
0 The court emphasized that the presence of counsel
was necessary to insure that the exact circumstances of
the confrontation would be preserved for trial review.
429 F.2d at 196. But c. Butler v. Robbins, 434 F.2d
1009 (st Cir. 1970).
1971]
